Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service
Commission of Utah : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary G. Sackett; Associate general Counsel; Counsel for Petitioner.
David L. Stott; Public Service Commission of Utah; Counsel for respondent.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service Commission of Utah, No. 910051.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3414

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Dor

fS9

*' N T

gRlEfc

tflQOS'l

pOCKEt-NO-'

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Case No. 910051
(Priority Category 15)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
[FINAL]

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

DAVID L. STOTT, Esq.

GARY G. SACKETT,

Public Service Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 530-6708

Associate General Counsel
Questar Corporation
180 East First South Street
P.O. Box 11150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
(801)534-5563
^
Counselfor
f" | L £
Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
a Questar Corporation subsidiary

Counsel for
Public Service Commission of Utah

[J

July 25, 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

^*^

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY MATTERS
Statement of Jurisdiction
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances and Rules
Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts
Summary of the Argument

1
1
2
3
3
3
4
7

DETAILED ARGUMENT

8

I.

IMPOSITION OF THE HISTORICAL 1989 TEST YEAR,
UNADJUSTED FOR ANY POST-1989 INFORMATION, WAS
UNLAWFUL

8

A.

INTRODUCTION

8

B.

As A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW,
THE PSC IS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE
CONCERNING THE COMPANY'S EXPECTED OPERATIONS,
COSTS AND INVESTMENTS DURING THE RATE-EFFECTIVE PERIOD

11

THERE IS NO FINDING OR EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT
TI£E 1989 TEST YEAR IMPOSED BY THE PSC REASONABLY
REPRESENTS CONDITIONS DURING THE RATE-EFFECTIVE PERIOD

18

THE PSC's FORECLOSURE OF THE PARTIES'
SUBMISSION OF PROJECTED OR FUTURE TEST YEAR EVIDENCE
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS UNDER THE UAPA
AND A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

21

THE COMMISSION'S UNSUPPORTED REJECTION OF
A FUTURE TEST YEAR IS A DEPARTURE FROM PAST
PRACTICE THAT IS PROSCRIBED BY THE UAPA

24

C.

D.

E.

F.

WHEN THE RECORD IS CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE AND
ALL THE EVIDENCE IS MARSHALLED, THE PSC'S

UAPA § 63-46B-16

25

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER TO USE AN AVERAGE
RATHER THAN A YEAR-END RATE BASE
Is NOT BASED ON SUFFICIENT RECORD EVIDENCE

32

TEST-YEAR CHOICE VIOLATES
G.

H.

THE REDUCTION OF THE RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY
FROM 12.2% TO 12.1% ON THE BASIS OF MOUNTAIN
FUEL'S AFFILIATE RELATIONSHIPS IS UNLAWFUL

39

A.

INTRODUCTION

39

B.

IMPOSITION OF A PENALTY REDUCTION OF THE ALLOWED
RATE OF RETURN IS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BEYOND
THE STATUTORY GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO THE PSC

40

THE REDUCTION FROM 12.2% TO 12.1%
Is NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

45

C.

CONCLUSION

48

ADDENDUM 1
PSC Report and Order, November 21, 1990
PSC Order on Application for Rehearing, January 10, 1991
ADDENDUM 2
Applicable Statutes
ADDENDUM 3
Utah PSC Proceedings in Docket No. 89-057-15
ADDENDUM 4
Previous Mountain Fuel Supply Company Rate Proceedings
ADDENDUM 5
Transcript of November 21, 1989, Proceedings

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITITES
CASES
Angell v. Board of Review,
750 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1988)

27

Askew v. Bevis, 37 Fla. Supp. 63, 283 So. 2d 337 (1973)

44

Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. PSC, 508 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1987)
City and County of San Francisco v. PUC,

13

39 Cal. 3d 523, 703 P.2d 381 (1985)
Dept. of Administrative Services v. PSC, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)

15
2, 21

First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization,
799 P.2d 1163 (1990)

18, 19, 26, 27

FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)
General Telephone Co. v. Michigan PSC,
341 Mich. 620, 67 N.W.2d 882 (1954)
In re: General Telephone Company of the Southwest,
98 N.M. 749, 652 P.2d 1200 (1982)
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review,
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)

10

44
44
18, 26

Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis, 289 So. 2d 401 (Fta. 1973)

11, 13

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 758 P.2d 957 (Utah App. 1988)

23

Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988)

26

Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. PSC, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 1984)
L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,
169 Ind. App. 652, 351 N.E.2d 814 (1976)

-iii-

40, 41
15

McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926)
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. PSC, 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986)

11
19, 30, 34

Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. PSC,
262 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1923)

43

Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUC,
62 Cal. 2d 634, 401 P.2d 353 (1965)

15

Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review,
775 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1989)

2

PUC v. Houston Lighting and Power Co.,
715 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App. 1986)

42

South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Utility Regulatory Commission,
637 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. 1982)

43

Southern New England Telephone Co. v. PUC,
282 A.2d 915, 29 Conn. Sup. 253 (1970)

13

Utah Dept. of Business Regulation, Division of
Public Utilities v. PSC, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980)

11, 12, 19

Utah Power & Light Co. v. PSC, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944)

10

West Ohio Gas Co. v. PUC, 294 U.S. 79 (1935)

12

-iv-

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment

23

Utah Constitution, art. 1, § 7

23

Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (1990)

3, 40, 46

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1990)

22, 23

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l (1990)

28

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12 (1990)

3, 5, 27

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (1990)

7

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-24 (1990)

41

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989)

7

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989)

1-3, 18, 19, 21, 23, 29-31, 48

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (Supp. 1990)

1

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Re: Test Periods in Rate Cases,
22 P.U.R.4th 611 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1977)
Uniform Model State Administrative Procedures Act § 511(c)(4)

-v-

17
3

PRELIMINARY NOTE
Mountain Fuel Supply Company's Opening Brief in this case was filed on
July 25, 1991, pursuant to the Court's grant of a request for a 15-day extension
after it was discovered that the Public Service Commission had not yet transmitted
the entire record to the Court. The augmented record had still not been submitted
by the due date for the opening brief. Accordingly, Mountain Fuel filed its
opening brief on July 25 with citations to the "raw record" compiled by the PSC,
with a request to file a "final opening brief upon availability of the record citations. This final opening brief replaces the original July 25 filing with the correct
record citations substituted. No textual changes have been made.
There are still two problems with the record. (1) The pagination from
pages 1-205 is repeated in Volumes I and II. Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, a
reference in the following brief to a page between 1 and 205 specifies Volume I
and Volume II. (2) Despite repeated requests to the Secretary of the PSC, the
transcript for the first day of the proceedings, November 7, 1989, has not been
included in the record transmitted to the Court. Because these proceedings are
important to the Court's understanding of one of the primary issues in the case,
Mountain Fuel has included a copy of the certified November 7 transcript as
Addendum 5 to its Final Opening Brief.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Case No. 910051
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
[FINAL]
Petitioner Mountain Fuel Supply Company (Mountain Fuel) respectfully
submits its initial brief in support of its petition for review of a decision of the
Public Service Commission of Utah (PSC or the Commission), issuea November
21, 1990, and its order on rehearing, issued December 31, 1990, in PSC Docket
No. 89-057-15. (The orders are designated as Addendum 1 to this Brief.)
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS
Statement of Jurisdiction.
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (Supp. 1990).

Statement of Issues and Standard of Review.
Mountain Fuel raises two general issues on review: (1) Whether the Public
Service Commission has unlawfully set utility rates that do not reasonably reflect
the conditions during the period that the rates will be in effect by basing 1991
rates exclusively on a "historic test year" 1989, and (2) whether the PSC has, in
effect, imposed an unlawful penalty on Mountain Fuel by reducing its authorized
rate of return below that which the PSC found otherwise to be a proper return on
shareholders' equity.
The standards for review for the issues in this case are provided by portions
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b16(4) (1989), as set forth in Addendum 2 to this Brief.
To the extent the issues that Mountain Fuel raises are mixed issues of law
and fact, § 63-46b-16(4) directly addresses the standard: Relief is to be granted if
an "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." The Utah Court of
Appeals has indicated that this Court's pre-UAPA analysis of the review of fact/
law questions in Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v. PSC, 658 P.2d 601, 610
(Utah 1983), is consistent with the UAPA's provisions. Pro-Benefit Staffing v.
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). As articulated in Administrative Services, the agency is to be accorded less deference than if the review
involved only the agency's findings of facts; in mixed questions, the inquiry will
be to see if the agency improperly exercised its discretion in applying the law.
-2-

Id., citing Comments, Uniform Model State Administrative Procedures Act
§ 511(c)(4).
In addition, Mountain Fuel believes that the PSCs order does not pass the
tests set forth in subsections (4)(b), (d), (g) and (h) of § 63-46b-16, as discussed
in more detail in the body of the argument.
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances and Rules.
In addition to the provisions from the UAPA cited in the previous section,
the PSC is required to set rates that are "just and reasonable" and for the utilities
to provide proper services, as those terms are found in Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1
(1990), and § 54-7-12(2)(b) (1990). (See Addendum 1.)
Statement of the Case.
Nature of the Case. Mountain Fuel is a natural gas public utility under
Title 54 of the Utah Code, and its rates and charges are regulated by the PSC
pursuant to the provisions of that title and applicable case law.
This case (PSC Docket No. 89-057-15) has arisen out of proceedings
initiated by the PSC in 1989 to determine new rates for Mountain Fuel, culminating in a report and order issued by the PSC on November 21, 1990, establishing
rates and charges to be effective December 1, 1990. Mountain Fuel believes the
rates specified by the PSC order are based, in material part, on unlawful procedures, premises and conclusions, the result of which is the failure of the PSC to
establish just and reasonable rates for Mountain Fuel in accordance with Utah law.
-3-

Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts. By notice of prehearing
conference issued on October 31, 1989, the PSC, on its own motion, commenced
an investigation into the rates and charges for the utility services Mountain Fuel
renders in Utah. (R. 1434-35.) A time-line of events is depicted in Addendum 3
to this Brief.
A prehearing conference was held by the PSC on November 7, 1989. As
the first order of business at the prehearing conference, prior to any discussion,
the Commission declared its intent to impose a historic test year1 on the development of Mountain Fuel's new rates.

u

[T]he Commission would like to have a

historical test year in this case, the test year being 1989." (Addendum 5, at 5.)
The PSC also requested that the parties address the relations of Mountain Fuel
with that of it affiliates, including its parent company, Questar Corporation and its
pipeline supplier, Questar Pipeline Company.
In response to PSC's declaration that Mountain Fuel file on the basis of a
historic test year, Mountain Fuel sought to file its case using a future test year that
more nearly matched the period when rates would become effective (the "rateeffective period"). (Addendum 5, at 15-17.) The Commission set the matter for

^ e "test year," as used in this proceeding, referred generally to the 12month period over which a utility's operations, costs, revenues and investment are
to be analyzed to determine new rates and charges. (R. 2423, Ex. DPU-10.1, at
1.) A historic test year is a year in which all events have concluded and books
and records and other information are available.
-4-

argument on November 21.
At the November 21, 1989, oral argument of counsel on the test-year issue
(R. 3-40, Vol. I), Mountain Fuel sought leave to submit comprehensive evidence
with its filing concerning its operations for both the years 1990—the future test
year—and the 1989 calendar year. (Addendum 5, at 6-7.) The Utah Division of
Public Utilities (Division) concurred with Mountain Fuel's proposal (Addendum 5,
at 17); the Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) requested that the 1989
year be used. (R. 23-24, Vol. I.)
The PSC took no evidence on the test-year issue and issued its bench order
at the close of the November 21 hearing, rejecting the request of Mountain Fuel
and the Division and requiring Mountain Fuel to file its case for the determination
of future rates2 on the basis of the calendar year 1989.

No written order was

issued, and no reasons were articulated at that time by the Commission. (R. 37,
Vol I.)
Pursuant to the bench order limiting the test year to 1989, Mountain Fuel
filed a request for rate relief under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12, on March 31,
1990, seeking a general annual increase of $9,682,000 in its rates for Utah ser-

2

Given the timing of the filing, the earliest that rates were likely to become
effective would be about December 1, 1990, the expiration of the 240-day limit
imposed on final Commission action by Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(3)(b) and (c)
(1990). Thus, the rate-effective period was likely (and so turned out) to begin in
December 1990 and run into 1991.

-5-

vice. (R. 1496-1510.) Within the constraint of a historical test year, Mountain
Fuel sought to mitigate the effects of a test year nearly two years removed from
the rate-effective period (1989 v. 1991) by using a 1989 year-end rate base3 and a
number of post-1989 adjustments to account for known and measurable changes in
the Company's operations.

(R. 2287, Ex. MFS-1R, at 5; R. 2297, 2300, Ex.

MFS-5, at 7, 10; R. 2346-48, Ex. MFS-5R, at 27-29.)
Following extensive discovery, several rounds of prepared, written testimony and other preliminary matters, evidentiary hearings began September 5, 1990,
and concluded September 18, 1990.

Oral argument was conducted on Septem-

ber 28, 1990, and the PSC issued a report and order on November 21, 1990 (the
Order), establishing new rates for Mountain Fuel, to be effective December 1,
1990.

The new rates were based on an annual revenue requirement of

$139,533,000 (exclusive of the costs of natural gas), only $76,000 more than
existing rates had been designed to produce.
To establish Mountain Fuel's rates for 1991 (and December 1990) the
Order incorporated, among other things:
(a) Operations and costs for the year 1989, purportedly rejecting all
post-1989 adjustments (R. 1968, 1972);
(b) A rate base (depreciated investment base) calculated by taking an
average over 1989 (R. 1969-70);

3

"Rate base" is the investment base on which the Company is entitled to earn
a return.
-6-

(c) A rate of return on shareholders' equity of 12.1%, which incorporated a .1% reduction "adjustment" related to the existence of transactions Mountain Fuel engages in with affiliate companies (R. 1992-93).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-7-15 (1990) and 63-46b-12 (1989),
Mountain Fuel sought rehearing of the November 21, 1990, order.

(R. 2094-

2133.) On January 10, 1991, the PSC issued its Order on Application for Rehearing, denying Mountain Fuel's requests.4 (R. 2161-65.)
Summary of the Argument.
The improper choice of test year and rate base. The main thrust of Mountain Fuel's position is that the PSC has not carried out its responsibilities to determine "just and reasonable rates" under applicable law, because it has improperly
excluded evidence designed to exhibit the conditions that would exist when the
new rates were to be effective.

There is not substantial evidence nor proper

findings to establish that the 1989 historical test-year data used by the PSC was
properly representative of the rate-effective period.

The rates imposed by the

Commission are the result of improper exclusion of evidence, improper application of the Utah Public Utility Code and interpretative case law, and action that
does not comport with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
Rate of return reduction. Having found a return of 12.20% to be a proper

Section 3 of the order on rehearing gave Mountain Fuel leave to "approach
the other parties with a view to having [a certain] adjustment stipulated." No such
stipulation was reached.
-7-

and lawful return on Mountain Fuel's shareholders' equity, the PSC penalized
Mountain Fuel by .10% (to 12.10%) because of the Commission's general displeasure with the corporate organization of Questar Corporation, the parent holding company of Mountain Fuel, and the affiliate relations that are a part of that
corporate organization. The Commission's actions are unjustified on the basis of
the record in this case, and they constitute an abuse of discretion and exercise of
authority that is beyond its statutory grant.
DETAILED ARGUMENT
I.

IMPOSITION OF THE HISTORICAL 1989 TEST YEAR, UNADJUSTED FOR ANY POST-1989 INFORMATION, WAS UNLAWFUL
A. INTRODUCTION

The primary issue in this case involves foundational principles of utility
ratemaking in the United States: Whether the Public Service Commission may
impose a condition on the receipt of evidence that forecloses the submission and
consideration of information and data that the applicant-utility believes to be more
representative of conditions expected during the rate-effective period; or, equivalent^, whether the PSC can establish just and reasonable rates for a period beginning in December 1990 without any finding that a 1989 historical test year, unadjusted for post-1989 information, is properly representative of the rate-effective
period.
It is undisputed that the ratemaking exercise is forward-looking and that the

-8-

role and duty of the Public Service Commission is to determine rates that are just
and reasonable when they become effective.

(See cases cited in part B of this

section.) One of the primary tools in carrying out this duty is the selection of a
test year, which provides a 12-month period of the utility's operations to be
analyzed and adjusted, with the goal of representing the period when rates will be
effective.

The Commission itself stated the purpose of the test year accurately:

"The purpose of a test year, or test period, is to provide revenue, expense, and
investment information that reasonably approximates circumstances expected
during the period rates will be in effect." (R. 1968.)
Having stated the function of a test year properly, and having recognized
the new rates would not become effective until almost 1991, the PSC proceeded to
frustrate attempts to reach this goal by prohibiting parties from submitting futuretest-year information concerning the utility's operations beyond December 31,
1989. In addition, it made no finding that the 1989 test year it had chosen had
sufficient nexus with or characteristics representative of the rate-effective period
that it would produce just and reasonable rates.
Thus, the test-year question is a mixed issue of law and fact. As a legal
matter, a test year must satisfy fundamental constraints of providing a proper
representation of the period during which rates will be effect, as discussed in more
detail below.

In determining whether a given test year—whether historical,

projected, adjusted or hypothetical—passes legal muster, there must be an inquiry
-9-

into the facts and circumstances.
Before this brief launches into a detailed discussion of the facts, circumstances and legal underpinnings of this case, it may be helpful to state what Mountain Fuel is not asking this Court to do. It is not seeking a judicial mandate that
the PSC must use a particular form of future test year or other device in order to
establish just and reasonable rates.6 Rather, this appeal seeks the Court's finding
that the PSC may not arbitrarily preclude, exclude or fail to consider relevant
information that parties may wish to submit in establishing just and reasonable
rates and, in so doing, limit the consideration to a particular historic period.
Parties should be allowed to present evidence, in the Commission's own words,
that "reasonably approximates circumstances expected during the period rates will
be in effect," and the PSC must determine just and reasonable rates for the future
period on the basis of such evidence.

5

For example, it might be factually established that the utility's operations and
the latent economic and financial conditions facing it are so stable and unlikely to
change that an unadjusted historical period would serve as a lawful surrogate for
the period when rates are effective. In this case, there was no such evidence or
fining; the evidence was to the contrary, as will be discussed below. Conversely,
materially changing conditions facing the utility—operationally, economically and
financially—dictate a different approach.
6

See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Utah Power
& Light Co. v. PSC, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, 558 (1944). In particular, a
historic test year, unadjusted for post-test-year changes is not per se unlawful,
although the very dynamics of today's changing world suggest that the incorporation of known changes and expectations will ordinarily produce a more representative result.
-10-

Mountain Fuel believes the PSC's complete failure to incorporate considerations of the future rate-effective period is reversible error,
B.

As A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW,

THE PSC IS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE
CONCERNING THE COMPANY'S EXPECTED OPERATIONS,
COSTS AND INVESTMENTS DURING THE RATE-EFFECTIVE PERIOD

The applicable case law in Utah, as well as in other jurisdictions, has
recognized the forward-looking nature of the ratemaking process:
[T]he basic approach in rate making is to take a test year and determine the revenues, expenses, and investment for the test year. The
test period results are adjusted to allow for reasonably anticipated
changes in revenues, expenses, or other conditions in order that the
test-period results of operations will be as nearly representative of
future conditions as possible.
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation, Division of Public Utilities v. PSC9 614 P.2d
1242, 1248 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). This standard has also been stated and
restated in virtually every part of the United States in which the question has
arisen.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue some 65 years ago, and the
principles stated then remain applicable today. In McCardle v. Indianapolis Water
Co., 272 U.S. 400, 408 (1926), the Court indicated that, in fixing utility rates,
"there must be an honest and intelligent forecast as to probable price and wage
levels during a reasonable period in the immediate future." In applying McCardle
in 1973, the Florida Supreme Court pointed out that "a rate making body . . .
cannot ignore an existing fact that admittedly will affect the future rates, * Gulf
-11-

Power Co. v. Bevis, 289 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1973). But the PSC's foreclosure
of future-year evidence a fortiori "ignored" facts that the Company wished to
submit that would "affect the future rates." By limiting the period for which it
considered information to December 31, 1989, the PSC could not complete its
duty to determine conditions that were "as nearly representative of future conditions as possible." Dept. of Business Regulations, 614 P.2d at 1248.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed similar considerations in West Ohio
Gas Co. v. PUC, 294 U.S. 79 (1935).

In that case, there was unchallenged

evidence of actual revenue and expenses for two succeeding years beyond the test
year. But the PSC refused to consider this in fixing new rates, and Justice Cardozo wrote:
We think the adoption of a single year as an exclusive test or standard imposed upon the company an arbitrary restriction in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment and of "the rudiments of fair
play" made necessary thereby. [Citations omitted.] The earnings of
the later years were exhibited in the record and told their own tale as
to the possibilities of profit. To shut one 9s eyes to them altogether,
to exclude them from the reckoning, is as much arbitrary action as to
build a schedule upon guess work with evidence available.
Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added). This principle applies directly to the case before
this Court. In West Ohio Gas, the Commission had the information and ignored
it; in Mountain Fuel's case, the Commission didn't allow the parties to submit
data and the information in the first place—in effect, "shutting [their] eyes to
them altogether." The result is the same. Rates have not been established as just

-12-

and reasonable.

See also Southern New England Telephone Co. v. PUC, 282

A.2d 915, 918, 29 Conn. Sup. 253 (1970).
Similar results and principles are stated in other jurisdictions. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently indicated that tt[T]he historical test year rate base,
expenses, and revenues are only helpfid in the rate-making process where past
operations are indicative of probable future operations." Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. PSC, 508 So. 2d 1361, 1369 (La. 1987) (emphasis added). The Louisiana court went on to indicate that "test year data should not be looked at in
isolation or arbitrarily applied," finding that the utility's operations during the test
year must be examined in order to determine whether they are representative of
the figures that would prevail in the future. Citing the Gulf Power case in Florida, the Louisiana Court concluded that the test year must "fairly represent the
future period for which the rates are being fixed." Id.
But the Utah Commission was having nothing to do with adjustments or any
finding that the 1989 test year was reasonably representative of the future period.
To the contrary, the PSC summarily rejected the Company's proffer (R. 4-15,
Vol. I) to submit evidence concerning the extent to which the year 1989 did or did
not represent the period when rates would be effective—beginning late 1990 and
continuing through 1991.7

The Commission recognized that the rate-effective period would primarily be
in 1991. "The rates we set in this docket will be in effect in 1991." (R. 1968.)
-13-

As stated above, the PSC may approach the establishment of rates for the
future period in more than one way, but it must do so in a way that recognizes the
forward-looking nature of the exercise and in a way that it is not arbitrary, capricious nor inconsistent with the evidence in the case.
Here, of course, the Commission short-circuited the process in two different areas: (1) It precluded the parties from submitting future test-year information
at the outset of the proceedings (R. 37, Vol. I), thus preventing Mountain Fuel
and the Division from attempting to establish on an evidentiary basis the extent to
which a projected or future test year would be more representative of conditions
during the period when rates would be in effect than would a 1989 test year. (2)
It adopted the 1989 test year but rejected all post-1989 adjustments of the parties,
with no finding that the 1989 test year, unadjusted for any post-period expectations
or occurrences, was a reasonable representation of the period during which rates
would become effective. (R. 1966-68, 1971-72.)
A long line of California cases also develops the governing principle—
namely, that the test period should provide information that "presents] as nearly
as possible the operating conditions of the utility which are known or expected to
obtain during the future months or years for which the Commission proposes to
fix rates" and that consequently yields estimates that "will be as nearly representa-14-

tive of future conditions as possible." City and County of San Francisco v. PUC,
39 Cal. 3d 523, 703 P.2d 381, 387 (1985), quoting Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUC, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 401 P.2d 353 (1965).
Indiana cases yield the same result.
The theory underlying the use of any test-year and adjustment method in the rate-making process demands that the data used provide an
accurate picture of the utility's operations during the period in which
the proposed rates will be in effect. . . . Significant changes in a
utility's operating structure, such as rapid plant expansion, may
render even the most current historical data inadequate as a basis for
predicting the results of future operations.
L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 169 Ind. App. 652, 351
N.E.2d 814, 828-29 (1976) (emphasis added; emphasis of "any" in original).
Here, the Utah PSC has precluded the parties from making such a showing,
and it has itself not made any finding that there is a connection between the 1989
period and the Company's future operations. In the Ayres case, the Court found
that "the selection of a test year and the adoption of an adjustment method are
complex issues of regulatory policy which must be resolved in light of the special
facts of each case."

351 N.E.2d at 830 (emphasis added).

Factual showings

were denied by the Utah PSC. It avoided this issue by prohibiting the parties
from presenting "special facts" and compounded the problem by rejecting what
information was available to make post test-year adjustments to 1989 to make it
more reflective of 1991.
Not only does the overwhelming weight of judicial precedent render the
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PSC's test-year actions to be unlawful, but every witness who addressed the subject of an appropriate test year reconfirmed the forward-looking nature of the
exercise and indicated that the test year should reasonably reflect the conditions
that will be in existence at the time that rates will become effective.

Company

witness Glenn H. Robinson addressed the issue in his direct and cross-examination
testimony (R. 2256-57, Ex. MFS-1, at 4-5; R. 213), as did James L. Balthaser
(R. 57, Vol. II).

So did witnesses for the Division and Committee:

Chester

Sullivant (Ex. DPU-1, at 12), Carl L. Mower R. 99, Vol. H; R. 487; R. 2415-16,
Ex. DPU-10, at 12-13); Michael Arndt (R. 680).
To the same end, Committee witness Mattiyahu Marcus and Division
witness Nile Eatmon unequivocally indicated that the determination of the cost of
equity capital for the utility is a forward-looking exercise that determines the cost
of capital for iht future period.8 This last point is of more than passing significance.

The Commission makes much of the necessity for matching (in time)

investment, revenues, expenses and the other ratemaking elements (R. 1964), but

8

This exchange took place with the Division's rate-of-return witness, Mr.
Eatmon:
Q. Now, is it correct that you endeavored to determine the
cost of capital for Mountain Fuel Supply Company for the period
during which rates, the new rates for Mountain Fuel, would t
effect?
A. Yes, sir.
(R. 725.) See also Dr. Marcus's testimony to the same effect. (R. 279.)
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it never addresses the fact that its historical test-year approach provides an automatic mismatch with the cost of equity capital, which is indisputably determined
for the future period.
Finally, even the Committee of Consumer Services, a state agency that has
vigorously taken the position that would focus on a period that yields the smallest
possible revenue requirement—the historical test year—attempted to support its
position by citing a New York Public Service Commission policy statement on
test-period issues that restates the fundamental principle:
[0]ur goal in setting rates would be to ascertain, as best we could,
what the utility's revenues, operating expenses, and conditions would
be in the period for which we were setting rates: the first twelve
months after the new rates became effective.
Re:

Test Periods in Rate Cases, 22 P.U.R.4th 611, 612 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1977)

(emphasis added). The PSC did not do "the best it could" in looking to the rateeffective period. Had it done so, it would have allowed parties to submit evidence
as they saw fit to establish new rates, and the Commission would then have made
the judgment, with all available information, of the conditions most representative
of the rate-effective period.
Notwithstanding the unanimous agreement among the parties and the PSC
itself that rates are to be determined from information that characterizes the revenues, operating expenses, investment and other conditions that would be facing the
utility during the rate-effective period, the Commission resolutely refused to
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entertain information and evidence concerning the rate-effective period and make
adjustments to 1989 data with post-1989 information that was in the record.
C.

THERE IS NO FINDING OR EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT

THE 1989 TEST YEAR IMPOSED BY THE PSC REASONABLY
REPRESENTS CONDITIONS DURING THE RATE-EFFECTIVE PERIOD.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires that agency action be
based on usubstantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). This Court has defined substantial evidence
as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion."

First National Bank of Boston v.

County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1990), Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) elaborated somewhat:
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 'something less than the weight of the evidence.'"
[Citation omitted.] "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"
There are two dimensions to the no-substantial-evidence analysis in this
case: First, with no evidence in hand, the PSC rejected parties' attempts to file
and analyze future test-year data to determine the future rates. Second, having
constrained the parties to a base test year of 1989, it rejected all proposals to
make adjustments based on post-1989 data and information. In the first instance,
there is an automatic failure of the substantial-evidence test; the fact-marshalling
exercise called for in Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165, produces an empty
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collection; and § 63-46b-16(4)(g)9 applies directly.
At the second level, the PSC still comes up short. Even after imposing a
1989 test year on the determination of 1991 rates, it further rejected all post-1989
adjustments.

(R. 1971-72.)

But this carries the implicit conclusion that the

unadjusted 1989 test year "reasonably approximates circumstances expected during
the period rates will be in effect" (the PSC's own words). Yet the PSC made no
such finding; it never "demonstrate^] that there is a logical and legal basis for the
ultimate conclusion."

Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. PSC, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378

(Utah 1986). Indeed, it could not. The dynamics of today's fast-moving energy
and utility businesses dictate that, lacking an affirmative evidentiary demonstration
that 1989's conditions reasonably model or represent 1990's, an unadjusted test
year cannot be "as nearly representative of future conditions as possible." Dept.
of Business Regulations, 614 P.2d at 1248.
Recognizing that it "must marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings," 799 P.2d at 1165, Mountain Fuel can find no reference in the PSC order
that cites any evidence connecting the 1989 test year with the conditions that will
exist in 1991.

To put it another way, no party's evidence addressed this key

linkage, and there is, accordingly, no substantial evidence to show that the PSC

9

Relief will be granted if "the agency action is based on a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
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has carried out its responsibility in determining just and reasonable rates for
Mountain Fuel for the rate-effective period.
The absence of evidence (much less substantial evidence) that would establish the connection between the 1989 test year and the rate-effective period is
fundamental and crucial. It is precisely the type of situation that the UAPA and
interpreting case law is designed to proscribe. The PSC has pursued an exercise
that is foundational^ defective: There is no substantial evidence that establishes
the 1989 historical test year as a reasonable representative of the conditions that
are facing Mountain Fuel and its current operations.
Indeed, the only hard evidence that attempts to connect the 1989 test year
with the 1991 period during which rates are effective cuts in the other direction.
Company witness Mr. Robinson sponsored an exhibit showing that there is still an
inflationary trend (R. 2279, Ex. MFS-1.5) and that the future test year is a better
match than the historical test year under the conditions facing Mountain Fuel at
this time (R. 2256, Ex. MFS-1, at 4). Carl L. Mower testified that "If properly
done, the forecasted test year would probably be more accurate than a historical
one. . . . "

(R. 492 [emphasis added].) Mountain Fuel and the Division were

denied the opportunity to "properly do" such a test year.
The significance of the inflation information is that it tends to disprove any
claim that, because inflation levels are less than they were five years ago (which
Mountain Fuel concedes), the rate-setting exercise does not need to move forward
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with more recent information. This is a tenuous argument at best if there were no
inflation driving up the costs of goods and services; however, it is almost axiomatic that inflation levels of the size indicated by Mr. Robinson (and not disputed by
any witness) will cause costs to increase.10 Thus, the PSC's action in refusing
to allow parties to submit future-year information or other forms of evidence to
show that the rate-effective period is not adequately represented by the 1989
historical test year, coupled with the rejection of all post-1989 adjustments, fails
the substantial-evidence test under the UAPA.

Failure of this test renders the

Commission's actions unlawful.11
D.

THE PSC'S FORECLOSURE OF THE PARTIES'

SUBMISSION OF PROJECTED OR FUTURE TEST YEAR EVIDENCE
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS UNDER THE UAPA
AND A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act declares agency action that is
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion to be unlawful.

Utah Code

Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) and (iv) (1989). To the extent that the PSC has some
discretion in adopting methods that will produce just and reasonable rates,12

10

Whether or not there might be offsetting effects is not the point here. If
there are, than the parties would presumably submit evidence to establish the point
one way or another. Here, again, the Commission foreclosed the parties from
making such showings.
n

Mountain Fuel believes that the Commission's action would also fail the less
stringent test applied to the review of agency decisions prior to the UAPA. See,
e.g., Dept. of Administrative Services v. PSC, 658 P.2d 601, 608-09 (Utah 1984).
12

For example, through Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1990).
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Mountain Fuel believes it has nevertheless abused that discretion by its action in
decreeing a 1989 historical test year and foreclosing the presentation of evidence
by the parties concerning a projected test year.
By any standard, the Commission's decision that it intended to require a
1989 historical test year, before hearing argument and to the exclusion of any
testimony or other evidence, was an arbitrary and capricious decision. It is not
action that would be taken by reasonable persons with knowledge and understanding of the substantive issues.

A reading of the transcripts for November 7 and

November 21, 1990, indicates the PSC's predisposition toward a 1989 test year,
independent of the urging of all parties that such an imposition was a factual
determination that had no evidentiary support. (R. 21, 23, 29, Vol. I.)
Even during the hearings, Division witness Mr. Mower indicated that it
would be better to roll the test year ahead by six months than to be restricted to
using 1989 data. (R. 2413, Ex. DPU-10, at 10; R. 1967.) But the PSC opted
not to adopt his suggestion.
The PSC was quick to saddle Mountain Fuel with the burden of establishing
its new rates in this proceeding (Addendum 5, at 5, 22), notwithstanding that the
Commission had initiated the investigation into Mountain Fuel's rates. The Company did not take issue with this burden,13 but then was forced to operate under

13

By its acquiescence, Mountain Fuel does not necessarily concede that, in a
case in which the PSC or other party initiates rate investigation, the utility compa-22-

Commission-imposed evidentiary constraints that precluded it from making its best
case for a proper rate determinations for the rate-effective period. Such action is,
in the first instance, a denial of due process under the section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the Utah Constitution, art. 1, § 7;14
and it is arbitrary or capricious, as this phase ordinarily construed.

See, e.g.,

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 758 P.2d 957, 960 (Utah App. 1988) ("without
any reasonable basis in the evidence").
The PSC may argue that it is not required to use a particular form of future
test year in the determination of just and reasonable rates. Strictly speaking, this
is correct.15

But that does not give it unlimited license to preclude the utility

company (or any other party) from presenting relevant evidence that would tend to
show that the applicable legal standard is satisfied with appropriate projections or
future-year analyses. The Commission may further argue that, in the absence of
the use of a future test year, it is entitled to limit appropriate adjustments to the
historical test-year information. In some factual instances, this also may be correct. But no facts were developed to establish such a result, and this, too, does

ny always has the affirmative burden of establishing or re-establishing the justness
and reasonableness of its rates. In this case, however, Mountain Fuel requested a
rate increase and thereby undertook a certain burden of proof.
14

Additionally, this means that UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(e) has not been satisfied
("the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure").
15

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1990) addresses the test-year choice and indicates, "The commission may adopt an appropriate future test period."
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not give the PSC authority to sweep away all post-test-period adjustments, leaving
the utility's rates to be set on the basis of information that is almost two years
removed from the actual rate-effective period.16
In sum, the PSC's exclusion of evidence that would allow it to determine
revenues, expenses and other conditions "as nearly representative of future conditions as possible" was arbitrary and capricious17 and a denial of due process.
E. THE COMMISSION'S UNSUPPORTED REJECTION OF
A FUTURE TEST YEAR IS A DEPARTURE FROM PAST
PRACTICE THAT IS PROSCRIBED BY THE

UAPA.

Since the mid-1970's, when utility rates and energy prices began to escalate
rapidly for a variety of reasons, Mountain Fuel has filed seven requests for general rate relief under appropriate Public Utility Code provisions on the basis of forecasted or fiiiture test years. These applications were supported by projections of
existing conditions for a future rate-effective period, with the incorporation of
known changes, trends and other techniques and information. The PSC has heard
these cases on that basis and has, by its orders, approved the use of these tech-

16

The untenable position that the Company was put in is illustrated at page 6
of the Order, where the Commission notes that the Division agreed that "the best
solution is to move the test period forward in time, nearer to the period rates will
be in effect." The Commission then noted that "This cannot be done," because
"we have ordered a 1989 test year." This has a distinct Catch 22 cast to it.
17

See page 27-28, infra, for a further discussion of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as applied to the PSC's after-the-fact rationalization of the historicyear choice.
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niques in every case.18
Mr. Robinson testified to the general development of these matters.
(R. 2256, Ex. MFS-1, at 4; see also counsel discussion, R. 5-7, Vol. I.)

Mr.

Mower, testifying for the Division, indicated that the Division had experienced no
major problems with past Mountain Fuel forecasting. (R. 510.)

This is signifi-

cant, as Mr. Mower has been with the Division of Public Utilities for many years
(R. 2404, Ex. DPU-10, at 1) and has participated in many utility rate cases during
that time.
The previous methods that have been used since the mid-1970's involved
forecasted test years, with projections based on trending, statistical extrapolation,
case-by-case analysis and consideration of known events for future periods. As
discussed below, the reasons given by the PSC for abandoning a 15-year-old
policy do not constitute a "fair and rational basis" for changing the policy. The
PSC has articulated "reasons" that are post-facto justifications for an action that is
contrary not only to past practice but to bedrock principles of utility ratemaking.
F.

WHEN THE RECORD IS CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE AND
ALL THE EVIDENCE IS MARSHALLED, THE PSC'S
TEST-YEAR CHOICE VIOLATES UAPA § 63-46B-16

This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have interpreted the UAPA to

18

Addendum 4 contains a table of general rate proceedings filed by Mountain
Fuel since 1975, showing docket numbers, order dates and references to adoption
of the future test year.
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require that a party aggrieved by an administrative action must "marshall all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the
[agency's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Boston First National, 799 P.2d at 1165, citing, e.g., Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
The simplest treatment of this standard is to iterate that the PSC took no
evidence when it rendered its decision on the test-year question, and there are,
On an issue that has a factual foundation,19

accordingly, no facts to marshall.

the absence of any record evidence to support the finding and conclusion that a
historic test year was a proper constraint constitutes a per se failure of the
UAPA's substantial-evidence test.

The PSC's action on November 7 and 21,

1989, is directly subject to this Court's admonition in First National Bank:
Although it is a "universally recognized rule" that this court must
"take some cognizance of the expertise of the agency in its particular
field and accordingly give some deference to its determination," the
agency's decision must rest upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a
creation of fiat.
799 P.2d at 1166, citing Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah
1988). The PSC's test-year choice was, in every sense of the phrase, "by fiat."
Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider the rationale set forth in the Commission's final order on the issue:

a

Our principal reason for this choice [historic

test year] was to avoid bogging down in debates about the adequacy of future test

19

The three major parties agreed on this. (R. 21, 23, 29, Vol. I.)
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year forecasting techniques at the very time we were endeavoring to learn the
actual circumstances of a utility we had not thoroughly examined for some years."
(R. 1965 [emphasis added].)
The Utah Court of Appeals has suggested that the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard of the UAPA is a sort of "catch-alT that would generally yield the right
of way to one of the Act's more substantive provisions (e.g., erroneous application of the law). Angell v. Board of Review, 750 P.2d 611, 612 n.2 (Utah App.
1988). Yet, it strikes Mountain Fuel that the Commission's stated primary reason
for foreclosing consideration of the future test year is a classic example of unlawful arbitrariness and caprice. In addition to the implicit admission that the principal reason for foreclosing the presentation of future-year evidence was motivated
by non-evidentiary considerations—a direct violation of UAPA § 63-46b-14(4)(g),
Boston First National, and a host of case law—the PSC's rationale directly implies that the task of determining just and reasonable rates is dependent on (1) the
Commission's convenience—its desire not to get "bogged down" in the very
details that it has a duty to examine under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(2)(b), and
(2) the absence of a major Mountain Fuel rate proceeding since 1985.
It is not reasonable to deny parties an opportunity to present evidence
designed to satisfy the legal standard of representing, as accurately as possible, the
conditions that will exist when the rates are in effect. The Commission's stated
reasons are simply unrelated to its duty and responsibility to determine just and
-27-

reasonable rates.

Furthermore, even if the "bog-down factor" were a proper

consideration, there was no evidence on this point. There were no allegations or
claims that a consideration of a future test year would produce an unmanageably
burdensome proceeding.
Indeed, circumstantial evidence and representations of the Division's counsel are to the contrary. In all Mountain Fuel rate cases since the mid-1970s, the
future test year was the foundation for the determination of just and reasonable
rates, and there has been no finding that the rigors of using a future test year are
outweighed! by the convenience of the Commission or the parties.
It is significant that the Division, which bears the lion's share of the responsibility for a rate-case investigation, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l (1990), and
might have had occasion to grouse about the burdens of a future test year, took no
exception to the Company's proposal to file on the future-year basis.

To the

contrary, the Division actively supported it, indicating that it would find the future
test-year filing helpful in analyzing the extent historical information was indicative
of the future period. (R. 17, 33-34, Vol. I.) The Commission's conjecture that it
would get "bogged down" in arguments about the future test year was, at best,
irrelevant speculation and, at worst, an after-the-fact construct for an arbitrarily
imposed prohibition.20 Mountain Fuel believes this is the sort of action that is

20

It's interesting to note that one Commissioner remarked that there would
probably be as much disagreement about historic test-year adjustments as there
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proscribed in § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).
Another part of the PSC's rationale is "because of the unusually and undesirably long time that has passed since our last rate case examination of this
utility."

(R. 1966.)

The PSC never explains why a five-year period of rate

stability over which the Company did not need to seek general rate relief is "undesirable."

To the contrary, the Commission "attribute[d] this, in part, to be a

result of the quality management of the company." In effect, the PSC's message
is:

If the Company manages its business prudently and efficiently and avoids

seeking general relief for an extended period, its absence is "undesirable," and it
is denied the opportunity to bring future-test-year evidence before the Commission
in an attempt to exhibit the conditions that will exist during the new rate-effective
period. It's difficult to understand this Through-the-Looking-Glass reasoning.
The PSC also states that "historical data has the advantages of simplicity
and accountability." (R. 1966.) A demurrer might be inserted here: Concede
the fact that there is something simpler than the consideration of the expected
future operations of the utility; what does this have to do with applying the legal
test of establishing just and reasonable rates? The answer is: Little or nothing.
Simplicity of derivation is not generally a valid criterion for setting lawful rates.

would have been about the future test year: "The historic test year is something
we haven't dealt with for quite some time and I can see almost an argument about
what's a known and measurable change as I can about what's a future test
year
" (R. 38, Vol. I.)
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This irrelevant observation does not address the legal responsibility before the
PSC. Particularly in the absence of any evidence that connects " simplicity and
accountability" with establishing the conditions that will exist when the rates are in
effect, the PSC's rationale does not pass the tests of UAPA §§ 63-46b-16(4)(g),
(h)(i) and (h)(iv).
Finally, the PSC order states that "Our analysis of the principal argument
in favor of a future test year, the adverse impact of inflation, convinced us that it
was not persuasive at this time." In the first place, the PSC does not divulge its
analysis. Although the agency may be accorded some deference in matters of a
technical nature, it must provide "subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the
critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as
to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions."
Milne, 720 P.2d at 1378. Here, the Commission states a conclusion that is devoid
of explanation.
The PSC's inflation syllogism is nothing more than: (1) the existence of
inflation is the primary reason that a future test year would be used, (2) inflation
isn't a problem for Mountain Fuel, and (3) therefore, there is no justification for
using (or examining, apparently) the future test year. There are at least two major
flaws to this logic.
First, the PSC's decision at the outset of the proceedings was not accompa-
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nied by any evidentiary discussion of inflation (nor "attrition"21) nor whether
there was an inflationary effect on Mountain Fuel's revenues and profits.

The

PSC cannot credibly argue that it rejected the future test year because of the
absence of inflation—an evidentiary conclusion. There was no evidence one way
or the other when the Commission made the decision.22
Second, and perhaps more important, no legal principle or evidentiary chain
of logic establishes the PSC's claim that inflation is the primary reason for using a
future test year. The applicable legal principle—that rates are to be established
for a future period—does not depend on the existence of inflation or attrition. In
the legion of cases cited earlier in this brief establishing the legal foundation for a
proper test year, the existence of inflation or attrition is never cited as a necessary
condition for using a future test year.23
When the reasons for the PSC's test-year decisions are marshalled, they do
not constitute—even after the fact—the quantum of evidence that is required by
UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(g).

21

"Attrition" was later defined in the proceedings as "a loss in the earnings of
the Company due to increasing costs." (R. 506.)
22

Subsequent evidence indicated that there is, and has been, ongoing inflation.
See text pages 20-21. The Order implied (or assumed) that there was no inflation.
^It may, however, be a sufficient condition. That is, the existence of an
attrition of earnings due to rising costs may, by itself, establish the need for a
future test year. But the Commission appears to confuse necessary conditions
with sufficient conditions in its arguments.
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G.

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER TO USE AN AVERAGE
RATHER THAN A YEAR-END RATE BASE
Is NOT BASED ON SUFFICIENT RECORD EVIDENCE.

The issue of rate base is a subissue of the broader question of whether the
PSC has properly applied the law to the facts of the case to produce just and
reasonable rates for the rate-effective period. To the extent that the Commission's
constraint confining the parties' filings to a historic 1989 test year is itself unlawful, the rate-base question is subsumed by such an infirmity. This discussion in
this section, however, examines the rate-base issue's individual elements to show
that, even by itself, this issue was decided wrongly by the Commission. To put it
another way, the PSC's choice of rate base methodology aggravated an already
unlawful ratemaking framework.
The purpose of the rate base is to establish the value of the utility's assets
on which it may earn its authorized rate of return during the rate-effective period.
Having imposed a historical test year on the parties, the PSC later singled out the
rate base for further consideration: whether, in the context of the 1989 test year,
an average or year-end rate base was appropriate. Mountain Fuel made its April
30, 1990 filing on the basis of the value of the Company's rate base on December
31, 1989 (the "year-end rate base"). (R. 2297, Ex. MFS-5, at 7.) The Division
was amenable to this approach (R. 2423-25, Ex. DPU-10.1, at 1-3), but the
Committee took the position that the rate base should be determined by taking an
average over 1989 (the "average rate base") (R. 680).
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This approach has the

effect of providing the value of the investment base at mid-year, or approximately
July 1, 1989—six months further in the past than a year-end value. (R. 65-66,
VoL H; R. 2424, Ex. DPU-10.1, at 2.)
If a utility's conditions are static over time, it will not matter what type of
rate base is employed. However, if conditions are changing over time, then the
type of rate base becomes critical, particularly where a test-year framework has
already been selected which inherendy provides a material mismatch between the
test year and the rate-effective period. Thus, the issue of which rate base to use—
as with the test-year issue itself—comprises both legal and factual components.
Given the PSC's requirement of a 1989 test year, what rate-base evaluation method will best meet the legal standard of determining just-and-reasonable rates for
the rate-effective period?
The Commission adopted an average rate base, stating three reasons in its
order. (R. 1968-69.) First, the Commission had apparently adopted an average
rate base methodology in the most recent U. S. West Communications and Utah
Power & Light Company rate cases.

Second, the Commission claimed that an

average rate base allows matching of revenues and expenses, and that a year-end
rate base creates a potentially misleading picture of the rate base at one point in
time. Third, the Commission found that the use of year-end rate base requires
substantial, difficult adjustments to revenues and expenses.
None of these reasons singly or in concert is sufficient to support the
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conclusion that an average, historic-year rate base should have been used in this
case. Other than a conclusory statement, the Commission made no finding, nor
cited evidence to support a finding, that the average, historic rate base combined
with an unadjusted 1989 test year would provide proper matching of rates with the
rate-effective period.
The Company's circumstances are different from those of Utah Power
& Light and U. S. West.
The PSC found "no compelling reason" to change from the average rate
base used in recent U.S. West and Utah Power & Light Company. If the rate
base issue were purely legal, then the use of those two precedents might be justified. However, as there are factual components, the holding must be based not
only on applicable law, but also on substantial evidence. The difficulty with the
holding is that it is not based on any factual determination. The PSC provided no
discussion—evidentiary or otherwise—to explain why Mountain Fuel's factual
circumstances are governed by the PSC's treatment of two other utility companies.
Consistency for the sake of consistency is not a substitute for reasoned decisionmaking and evidence-based conclusions.

See generally Milne, 720 P.2d at

1378-79.
Although it is true that the Commission regulates Mountain Fuel under the
same public utility code as it does U.S. West and Utah Power & Light, it does not
follow that their circumstances are similar enough to require the use of the same
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rate-base analysis.

In fact, Mountain Fuel witness Mr. Robinson testified that

both U.S. West and Utah Power & Light have stable or declining rate bases,
whereas Mountain Fuel's rate base is increasing; therefore, a year-end historic
rate base is more appropriate than an average historic rate base.24 (R. 212-13.)
It is confiscatory to use average, historic rate base when actual year-end and
current rate base and investment on the Company's books represent a higher value
that is closer to the rate-effective period.25
A year-end rate base (for a historic test-year) provides a more accurate view of conditions for the rate-effective period.
Within the constraint of the PSC-imposed 1989 test year, the appropriate
question is: Under the factual circumstances facing Mountain Fuel, does the average rate base or the year-end rate base better represent the conditions the utility
will face during the rate-effective period? The PSC's characterization of the yearend rate base as a "snapshot" is not inapt. But, contrary to the Commission's
implication, this is not a negative consideration. In contrast to such ratemaking
elements as costs, which are sums usually aggregated over a 12-month period, the
rate base is inherently a "snapshot" quantity; at any moment, it represents the

24

This argument is made in the context of the Commission's imposition of a
historic test year. An average rate base in an appropriate future or forward test
year may be a proper means of evaluating the utility's investment for the rateeffective period.
^Conversely, with a historic test year and declining rate base, use of average
rate base will produce inappropriately high rates.
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capital dedicated to the utility operation.
Thus, the "snapshot" of the rate base that is closer in time to the rate-effective period will have a better chance of matching the quantity of investor funds
with the rate-effective period.26

Division witness Mr. Mower hit the legal test

right on the button: "The rate base and level of operations of the Company are
still increasing and the end of the year levels will better match the time period that
rates will be in effect." (R.2425, Ex. DPU 10.1, at 3.) The PSC ignored this
crucial test in favor of its claims about "difficult adjustments, fraught with policy
implications."

As Mr. Mower testified, any "difficult adjustments" had been

made, and there is no indication of what "policy implications" would stand in the
way of updating the rate base. As indicated on page 9, line 4, of Jt. Ex. 2, dated
September 26, 1990, use of an average-year calculation reduces the rate base by
$9,542,000.
Use of a year-end rate base moves the measure of investment forward by
six months, as the average rate-base approach effectively uses mid-year levels.
(R. 65-66, Vol. II.) Two Mountain Fuel witnesses and two Division witnesses
testified that a year-end rate base would more accurately reflect actual conditions,
because, among other things, the data is moved forward six months.
(Mr. Robinson, R. 212-13; Mr. Balthaser, R. 69, Vol. II; Mr. Mower, R. 85-86,

26

See note 8 and accompanying text concerning the forward-looking nature of
the rate-of-return determination.
-36-

Vol. H; R. 507; R. 2419, Ex. DPU-10, at 16; and Mr. SuUivant, R. 527.)

No

one testified that the average rate base was more representative than the year-end
rate base for the rate-effective period.
The necessary calculations were made to support a year-end rate
base.
Even if a year-end rate base "requires that substantial, difficult adjustments,
fraught with policy implications, be made to revenues and expenses" (R. 1969),
this is not sufficient to reject a year-end rate base unless it is apparent from the
record that such calculations cannot or have not been made. The record in this
case establishes the contrary.

Most notably, in response to questions from the

Commission, Mr. Mower clearly stated that the Division had made the necessary
calculations for this case. (R. 86, Vol. II.)
More to the point, the Commission's implication that a historic year-end
rate base "requires that substantial, difficult adjustment, fraught with policy implications, be made" is not consistent with the evidence in this case. Mr. Mower's
grudging "comfort level" for an average historic rate base27 is not the relevant
consideration. In this case, the calculations had been made; the year-end information was available and a part of the record; and year-end rate base moved closer
to satisfying the fundamental requirement of matching rates with rate-effective
period conditions.

27

R. 1969; R. 86-87.
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The Committee offered no evidentiary support for the use of an average rate base.
The Committee's evidentiary support for an average rate base was virtually
non-existent. The Committee withdrew its initial submittal on average rate base
(Tr. 101-03, Vol. II), leaving only Committee witness Michael L. Arndt's testimony.

Mr. Arndt summarized his position on average test-year approach

(R. 654):
The average test year approach is consistent with prior Commission
rulings and produces the desired matching of investment, revenues
and expenses. The year end test period approach, on the other hand,
focuses on a single point in time and requires numerous year end
adjustments to achieve the necessary and proper matching of investment, revenues and expenses.
Such adjustments are complex, speculative and contrary to the
Commission's intent to simplify the ratemaking process.
These are conclusory statements without any factual support in the record.
It is significant that nowhere in the record did Mr. Arndt or any other witness
indicate that the year-end rate base was not calculable. Indeed, as indicated by
Mr. Mower, those calculations were made by the Company and the Division. The
simple assertion that calculations need to be made is not by itself sufficient to
support the rejection of a year-end rate base. To the extent that the calculations
employ more recent data, they should be made as a matter of course if it results in
a better matching of rates with the conditions in the rate-effective period.
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H.

THE REDUCTION OF THE RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY FROM
12.2% TO 12.1% ON THE BASIS OF MOUNTAIN FUEL'S AFFILIATE
RELATIONSHIPS IS UNLAWFUL.
A.

INTRODUCTION

On pages 23-30 of the Order (R. 1985-92), The PSC discusses the appropriate rate of return on common shareholders' equity and concludes: "[W]e find
the cost of equity to be 12.2%." (R. 1991.) Although Mountain Fuel may not
necessarily agree that this level is satisfactory, it has not taken legal issue with this
determination.

However, the PSC did not permit Mountain Fuel to file and

charge rates on the basis of the 12.2% that the Commission found to represent the
cost of equity in the ratemaking equation.
Instead, it "imposefd] an adjustment in the form of a reduction in the
allowed rate of return of 10 basis points"—from 12.2% to 12.1%. 28 (R. 1993.)
The reason given for this "adjustment" is that "we [the PSC] take issue with the
management of the company's parent, Questar Corporation."

(R. 1992.)

On

rehearing, the PSC partially justified its return adjustment on the basis that "setting rates . . . is not a precise science" and that, in any event, 12.1% is within the
"zone of reasonable rates" established for rate of return. (R. 2163-64.)

One basis point = .01%.
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B.

IMPOSITION OF A PENALTY REDUCTION OF THE ALLOWED
RATE OF RETURN IS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BEYOND
THE STATUTORY GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO THE PSC.

The Public Service Commission has no inherent regulatory powers.
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. PSC, 682 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1984). Although it has
the authority to determine rates Mountain Fuel may charge, it has limited powers
to impose penalties and other punitive measures. In this case, the PSC has explicit statutory authority to determine just and reasonable rates for the utility companies for which it has statutorily granted jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1
(1990). But the Commission has partially founded rates on the basis of a reduction in the allowed rate of return for Mountain Fuel because of its general dissatisfaction with "the management of the Company's parent, Questar Corporation."
(R. 1992.) Although the text of the Commission's order characterizes the reduction as an "adjustment," it is a penalty in every sense of the word. Indeed, the
Commission's order, in what might be a Freudian slip, addressed the general issue
of affiliate transactions in terms of "penalties" in the table of contents of its November 21 Order. (R. I960.)29
Quite apart from the absence of any finding that the affiliate relationships of

29

This characterization was apparently changed in the text of the order to refer
to "disallowances," but it seems a fair inference that the mindset of the Commission was to consider penalizing Mountain Fuel and its parent, Questar Corporation, for their particular corporate structure and relationship.
See also
R. 2011-13.
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Mountain Fuel adversely affected the rates charged to its customers (see discussion
in § C below), the PSC's authority to impose sanctions, penalties and reparations
on a utility is limited to those provided for by statute. Title 54 of the Utah Code
provides a variety of methods and actions that the Commission can take, including
injunction, penalties, fines, and reparations for certain specified situations.

E.g.,

Utah Code Ann, §§ 54-7-24 through -29 (1990). There is, however, no statute
that provides the authority—and the Commission has cited none—for dispensing
punishment to Mountain Fuel by lowering its authorized rate of return.
This issue is a matter of law, and the Court must apply a correction-oferror standard. Kearns-Tribune, 628 P.2d at 859. There is no clearly defined
statutory grant of authority authorizing the imposition of penalties for a fabric of
corporate affiliations that the Commission cannot identify as being the cause of
any rate detriment to Mountain Fuel's customers. To the extent that the Commission would have found imprudently incurred or other unjustified costs, it has the
authority to deny cost coverage.30

But is does not have the authority to penal-

ize Mountain Fuel because of the holding-company framework in which the

30

The Commission did adjust cost coverage in this docket from one relatively
small affiliated-related transaction, the "Brewery property" issue. (R. 1979-81.)
To the extent that the action taken on this issue is otherwise lawful and sustainable, the Commission's cost-recovery-adjustment "remedy" is appropriate because
it is specifically oriented around the facts and circumstances of identifiable costs
and rate effects. Further, the PSC appears not to have relied on the Breweryproperty issue in reducing Mountain Fuel's return on equity.
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Company operates its utility business.31
The courts have been called upon to review a variety of adjustments and
penalties related to the rate of return and have produced a spectrum of results as a
function of the underlying statutory scheme and the precedential state law. There
have been a number of cases in which a public utility commission has penalized a
utility for providing substandard service or for exhibiting mismanagement. No
such factual finding has been made in this case.
But even in cases of a demonstrated potential negative effect on rates, many
courts have found that regulators' rate-of-return penalties are not lawful.

For

example, the Texas Court of Appeals has examined this question in a context that
allows even wider agency discretion and authority to make rate-of-return adjustments than in Utah. In PUC v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 715 S.W.2d
98, 103-04 (Tex. App. 1986), the Texas court found that the statutory framework
provided "no implied authorization . . . for imposing a rate penalty," and:
[T]he Commission's reduction of a rate of return found by it to be
reasonable, as a penalty for mismanagement, exceeds the Commission's authority under [Texas law] and substantially prejudices the
rights of [the utility] by depriving it of revenues . . . beyond the
general findings of poor management and unreasonable expenses,
there is no stated basis for lowering the rate of return . . . .
In Mountain Fuel's case, the Commission's rate-of-return reduction is an

3

fountain Fuel is a wholly owned subsidiary of Questar Corporation, a
nonoperating holding company that is a Utah corporation. See R. 2280, Ex.
MFS-1.6, which gives the Questar Corporation structure.
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even more obvious excursion outside the boundaries of its legal authority.

It

found no evidence of mismanagement, and it made no finding that rates of Mountain Fuel's customers were adversely affected by what it perceived as an undesirable corporate structure.32

(R. 1208-13, 1991-92, 1998-99, 2011-13.)

Some

courts have sustained rate-of-return adjustments on the basis of poor service, but
the Houston Lighting case distinguishes these from cases like Mountain Fuel's
because "there are no findings of poor service to ratepayers."

715 S.W.2d at

103.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has reached similar conclusions in observing that "the legislative grant of power to regulate rates will be strictly construed," so that "granting the Commission the authority, in a rate case, to penalize
the utility for poor service would be an improper extension of the statutory procedure." South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Utility Regulatory Commission, 637
S.W.2d 649, 653 (Ky. 1982). This Kentucky case is, once again, all the stronger
relative to the Mountain Fuel situation because it involves a finding of poor ser-

32

The Commission's apparent displeasure with the current corporate structure
(which it approved in 1984) is not reasonable. Private investors in the United
States are entitled to form corporations and subcorporate structures as they see fit,
so long as the businesses they operate are willing to meet the standards of the law
and regulatory constraints as they find them. The Commission's general malaise
over the choice made by the investors and managers of Questar Corporation
cannot lawfully be translated into penalties against one of that corporation's subsidiary entities. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
PSC9 262 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1923).
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vice. Even where the utility has been found to provide something less than the
expected standard of service, the Commission has no power to penalize the company through rate-of-return adjustments. According to the Kentucky court,
It seems to us that there is an inherent danger in permitting
poor service as a basis for setting rates, particularly in the imposition
of a penalty which results in a reduction of a rate which the Commission has already found to be fair and reasonable. There are no
objective, definable standards upon which to base a penalty. It is, at
best, arbitrary and subjective. Punitive actions should not be subject
to the possible whims of individuals, including those serving on a
responsible administrative body. In the present case, it appears that
the Commission was upset or frustrated by what it deemed Bell's
failure to improve its service in a previous case. . . . This case is a
classic example of arbitrary and subjective judgment.
Id. at 653. The New Mexico Supreme Court reached the same result:
The [State Corporation Commission] may not demand rate forfeitures
on service deficiencies from a regulated company for noncompliance
with its after-the-fact determination of a fair and reasonable rate of
return. To the contrary, the SCC had a constitutional duty in a rate
case to adopt rates that "will allow [the utility] to operate successfully, maintain its financial integrity, attract capital, and compensate
investors for the risk assumed."
In re:

General Telephone Company of the Southwest, 98 N.M. 749, 652 P.2d

1200, 1207 (1982). On the facts in Mountain Fuel's case, the Utah Commission's
action is even less justifiable than that of the New Mexico Commission. See also
General Telephone Co. v. Michigan PSC, 341 Mich. 620, 67 N.W.2d 882 (1954);
Askew v. Bevis, 37 Fla. Supp. 63, 283 So. 2d 337 (1973).
The Commission may argue that its action is not a "penalty." The context
in which it was imposed and the "slip of the pen" in the table of contents of the
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report and order demonstrate the contrary. The Utah Commission has sought to
reduce the otherwise just and reasonable compensation to Mountain Fuel's shareowners because of its general dissatisfaction with the corporate family within
which Mountain Fuel resides. This is not within the statutory powers granted to
the Public Service Commission,
C. THE REDUCTION FROM 12.2% TO 12.1%
Is NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) requires that agency action based on a
determination of fact must be "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record." The only foundation for the reduction of the equity
rate of return from that otherwise found to be just and reasonable is the general
existence of the Company's current affiliate relationships. The Commission has
cited no justification for the reduction outside of its general dissatisfaction with the
corporate structure in which Mountain Fuel operates. There has been no finding
of Mountain Fuel management imprudence, nor has there been any disallowance
of costs that would signal malfeasance or mismanagement of the utility operations
that serve Utah customers.

In the course of the proceedings, several witnesses

addressed the affiliate relations of Mountain Fuel. With one minor exception,33
the PSC did not adopt any contested, material adjustment to Mountain Fuel's cost

33

\n adjustment was made to revalue portions of a multiple-party real estate
transaction that involved, among others, an affiliate of Mountain Fuel.
(R. 1979-81.)
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of service or other ratemaking elements in connection with its affiliate relationships. (See, e.g., R. 1981-82, 2003-05; R. 1979-80, 1999-2001.)
To the contrary, the Commission found that the Company's long absence
from the rate-making arena is attributed "in part, to . . . the quality management
of the Company" (R. 1965) and that "without the benefit of systematic examination, [ ] Company management has performed very well in most respects."
(R. 1992.) Although the Commission *take[s] issue with the management of the
Company's parent, Questar Corporation," there is no finding that Mountain Fuel
has conducted its affairs in any way that is prejudicial to its carrying out its responsibilities under Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 to provide quality natural gas service to its Utah customers. The Commission cited, with apparent concurrence,
the Division's conclusions that "there was not evidence that [affiliate] transaction
charges were inappropriate" and that "the Company had readily provided requested information about its affiliate transactions." (R. 1980.)
The Commission's implication that it might organize the Company differently were it to be managers of the Company is not sufficient reason to penalize
Mountain Fuel for its place in the corporate organization of Questar Corporation—an organization which, as the Commission has noted (R. 1992), it approved
in 1984 in Docket No. 84-057-10.34

34

Short of a divestiture of the distribution

0rder issued October 1, 1984.
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company, there will of necessity be intracorporate transactions between Mountain
Fuel and the parent and other affiliates.

Thus, the Commission's reduction of

Mountain Fuel's rate of return appears to be based on its general displeasure with
the organization itself, not on any substantial evidence of an abuse of the corporate
framework.
An independent failure of the PSC's rate-of-return penalty is the absolute
absence of evidence on the quantification of any penalty or adjustment to the rate
of return. The rate-of-return issue was the subject of extensive evidence—written
testimony, exhibits, analyses, cross-examination—and not a word was uttered or
written by any witness on what would be an appropriate measure of a decrement
to the cost of capital under the PSC's theory of adjustment.
The Houston Lighting court identified this as a fundamental evidentiary
problem:
[W]e observe that no objective standard exists for imposing a
rate penalty. The Commission concedes that the .5% penalty is
without support in the record. Beyond the general findings of poor
management and unreasonable expenses, there is no stated basis for
lowering the rate of return by .5%, as opposed to .3% or .7%
715 S.W.2d at 104. A similar situation exists in the Mountain Fuel case—with
even less justification to impose penalties. Not only was there a complete void of
evidence linking the ensemble of interaffiliate matters with the rate of return or on
the quantification of penalty for any PSC-perceived transgressions of Mountain
Fuel, there was no finding of "poor management and unreasonable expenses."
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The Texas court's reasons for rejecting penalties for the absence of evidentiary
support are all the stronger when applied to Mountain Fuel.
Quite simply, the PSC's rate of return reduction does not satisfy the substantial-evidence test of § 63-46b-16(4)(g), nor the provisions proscribing arbitrary
and capricious action in subsection (4)(h)(iv).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mountain Fuel believes the PSC's November 21, 1990, Report and Order does not comply with applicable standards of
statutory and case law.
Mountain Fuel seeks relief from this honorable Court as follows: (1) An
order voiding the PSC's .1% penalty to rate of return and permitting Mountain
Fuel to file new tariff sheets incorporating a 12.2% equity rate of return. (2) An
order remanding the issue of the test year to the Commission with instructions to
permit Mountain Fuel to seek the establishment of rates to be based on the legal
principles set forth in this Brief—in particular, to permit the Company and other
parties to submit evidence that it believes will establish as nearly as possible the
conditions that will exist when the rates are effective. (3) An order requiring the
PSC, in the absence of the development of a full new record for a future period,
to allow Mountain Fuel to refile tariffs based on the use of the 1989 year-end rate
base as the lawful measure of the level of investment entitled to earn a return, as a
-48-

matter of law on the record established in the proceeding.
Respectfully submitted,
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY

Associate General Counsel
Questar Corporation
180 East First South Street
P.O. Box 11150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Counsel for
Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
a Questar Corporation subsidiary
July 25, 1991
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DOCKET NO. 89-057-15
REPORT AND ORDER
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November 21. 1990

1989 TEST PERIOD RATE CASE

SYNOPSIS
By this Order the Commission has established a revenue
requirement for the Company of $139,533,000 and an allowed overall
rate of return of 11.03 percent.
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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Commission on its own motion and pursuant to Section
54-4-2 and other applicable statutory provisions determined to
commence a formal investigation into the reasonableness of the
rates and charges of Mountain Fuel Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel"
or "Company").

A notice of prehearing was issued on October 31,

1989, in which the Commission indicated that- t-vn* «;«„^« ~* /-x — ^ r m ^ ^
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of return, (2) affiliate relationships, and (3) cost of service
were to be addressed.

The prehearing was held on November 7, 1989.

On November 21, 1989, the Commission bench-ordered that a
1989 historical test year would be employed.

In response to a

Mountain Fuel motion, and following a hearing on the subject, the
Commission issued a Protective Order on January 31, 1990.
On January 22, 1990, the Division filed a motion to
consolidate Dockets 90-057-02 (gas cost proceeding) and 89-057-15
(general rate case).

The motion was granted.

Mountain Fuel filed an application for a general rate
increase in the amount of $9,682,000, on March 30, 1990.

The

Commission set the application for prehearing on April 10, 1990,
and, at the prehearing, determined a schedule for the proceedings.
This schedule was subsequently amended owing to motions filed by
the Division of Public Utilities ("Division") and the Committee of
Consumer Services

("Committee").

In one instance the Committee

requested clarification about a Commission-directed inquiry of the
Wexpro Agreement.

In another, the Division alleged failure of the

Company to comply with the timetable for response to discovery
requests.

Sanctions were demanded by the Division.
On June 27, 1990, the Commission issued a formal order

denying the Divisionfs request that the Company be sanctioned for
failure to meet discovery requirements and granting a request of
the parties that a new schedule be set for the case.
On August 27, 1990, the Commission sent a memorandum to
the parties notifying them that the issue of the appropriate testyear rate base would be the first item addressed in the hearings.
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In addition, the Commission directed the parties to prepare a joint
exhibit of their respective positions on the rate case issues.
Hearings began on September 5, 1990.

The Committee, on

September 17, 1990, filed a motion to compel the Company to respond
to a data request and to impose sanctions.

The Commission again

declined to impose sanctions but directed Mountain Fuel to respond
to the data request.

On September 27, 1990, following the con-

clusion of the hearings, the parties filed the required joint
exhibit.

Thereafter,

the parties

filed briefs explaining and

defending their respective positions.

II,

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO
DETERMINATION OF REVENUE REQUIREMENT

Early

in this docket

emerged as a key issue.

formulation

of the test period

We had ordered the use of a 1989 historic

test year after having considered the parties1 arguments, pro and
con.

Our principal reason for this choice was to avoid bogging

down in debates about the adequacy of future test year forecasting
techniques at the very time we were endeavoring to learn the actual
circumstances of a utility we had not thoroughly examined for some
years.
The last Mountain Fuel rate case was concluded in 1985.
Since then, several rate decreases have occurred as a result of
decreases in gas costs.
to seek rate relief.

In addition, the Company found no reason

We attribute this, in part, to be a result of

the quality management of the Company.
pal armmonf -5« ^«*T»~— -* - ~ *

•

Our analysis of the princi-
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inflation, convinced us that it was not persuasive at this time.
Implicitly, therefore, we did not recognize the need for attrition
adjustments.
TJius, use of a historic test year in this proceeding is
important in part because of the unusually and undesirably long
time that has passed since our last rate case examination of this
utility.

Actual, historical data has the advantages of simplicity

and accountability.
case

analysis,

In general, such data can be used for rate

thereby

minimizing

the use

of

forecasted

data

derived by technical and debatable methods.
Prior to this rate case we adopted a rule prescribing
test

year

annualization

guidelines.

It

did

not

contemplate

historic test years and, as the evidence on this record shows, is
not readily applicable to them.

A future test year embodies

forecasted revenues, expenses, and investment; that is, forecasts
of changes in both prices and quantities of inputs and outputs.
The annualization rule attempts to confine ad hoc test year adjustments to those that are not linked, logically and economically,
with other revenues, expenses, or investments; those, in the words
of the rule, where interdependencies are minimal.

This generally

means that price, as distinct from volume or quantity, changes may
be acceptable.

An increase in the price of postage stamps occur-

ring during the test year is one example:

in the short term, it

may affect nothing else, such as the volume of mailings.

However,

the price increase is beyond managements control, and failure to
account for it may unfairly decrease the opportunity to earn a fair
return.

Yet, revenues, expenses, and investments must be matched
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may impose a risk of under-recovery*

When the period between rate

cases is short this risk is lessened, as is the potential for
mismatch when, as is the case here, accounting data is used to
approximate complex economic interrelationships.

But when this

period is as long as it has been, out-of-period adjustments should
be based upon an economic model of the firm.

Without the under-

standing of economic relationships such a model provides, the use
of accounting data will tend to support selective adjustments to
the test year that are one-sided, and generally proposed by those
having information and expertise.

This will lead to an undesirable

mismatch of investment, revenue, and expenses, generally increasing
revenue requirement.

Selective adjustments, in short, may yield a

less representative test period for ratemaking purposes than no
adjustments at all.
The purpose of a test year, or test period, is to provide
revenue,

expense,

and

investment

information

that

reasonably

approximates circumstances expected during the period rates will be
in effect.
1991.

The rates we set in this docket will be in effect in

Are post-test-period adjustments required to approximate

future circumstances?

The Company, and in part the Division, say

yes; the Committee, no.

The Company argued that post-test-year

adjustments must be made; the Division, that such adjustments can,
with difficulty, be made; and the Committee, that such adjustments
create more problems than they solve.

According to the Division,

the best solution is to move the test period forward in time,
nearer to the period rates will be in effect.
in this docket.

This cannot be done

First, we have ordered a 1989 test year, parties
X \J -L
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Averaqe-of-Year Versus End-of-Year Adjustments
"1.

Aver age R a t e Base
C e r t a i n a n n u a l i z a t i o n a d j u s t m e n t s d e p e n d on t h e choice? of

average

or
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reflects

year-end
f: e s t:

rate

j ea r ,
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base is six months nearer in time.

The Division agreed, though

under questioning from the Commission, its witness, citing the
complexity

of

adjustments

to

test-year

revenues

and

expenses

necessitated by end-of-year rate base, stated a preference for
using average-of-year rate base.
average-of-year

rate

base

The Committee recommended use of

based

upon

consistency

with

prior

Commission rulings and more accurate matching of known test-year
investment, revenues, and expenses.
end-of-year

According to the Committee,

rate base, a single point

in time, requires that

numerous complicated adjustments be made to revenues and expenses
to restore a proper matching.
The Commission finds an average rate base appropriate for
the following reasons.

First, the Commission has relied on average

rate base in recent U S WEST Communications and Utah Power and
Light dockets.

The present docket has produced no compelling

reason to depart from that practice.

Second, an average-of-year

rate base provides an appropriate basis for matching the annual
flows of revenues and expenses to the average annual stock of plant
and equipment employed by the utility and to the manner in which
the utility has been operated.

An end-of-year rate base is a mere

snapshot, a potentially misleading picture of rate base at one
point in time.

Third, an end-of-year rate base requires that

substantial, difficult adjustments, fraught with policy implications, be made to revenues and expenses.

Because the Company's

application reflects end-of-year rate base, our acceptance of the

^ V JL </ i
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Committee's recommendations for average-of -year rate base decreases
h cl S O
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2.

End of-Year Depreciation
.. The
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The dollar value of this adjustment is the change in rate
base our decision requires. Likewise., our following revenue and
expense decisions are expressed as the dollar adjustments required.
None of the adjustments are stated in revenue requirement terms
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ing the declining trend exhibited

over the last decade.

The

combined effect of the annualization of the number of customers and
the usage per customer would be a decrease in revenue of $1,057,000
according to the Company.
The Committee took the position that the average test
year approach produces the desired matching of investment, revenues, and expenses and therefore recommended against both adjustments.
The Commission, having adopted the average test year
approach, finds the Committee's position appropriate, and rejects
both adjustments.

B.

Post-Test Period Adjustments
Eight post-test-year adjustments were proposed, all but

one of them by the Company.

Two of these, the ffET-2ff and "customer

X" adjustments, though partially offsetting, would increase revenues.

Six of them would increase expenses: 1990 labor adjustment,

pension plan adjustment, Questar Service 1990 adjustment, production-related depreciation, FICA tax, and gross receipts tax.

The

effect of accepting them all would be a small increase in test
period revenues and a much larger increase in test period expenses.
With one minor exception the Committee recommended rejecting the
adjustments.
The Division proposed and supported one revenue adjustment and recommended rejecting the one proposed by the Company.
The six expense adjustments were proposed by the Company.
Division
^lennfo^

recommended
4-Vio

H n l l a r

rejecting
amnnnfe

o-F

two of them
*hVio

r o m a i n i nrr

and
fnnr

The

supported, but
Wo

wi 1 1

nn+-
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2.

Promotional Advertising
The Company testified that $309,000 in test-year pro-

motional advertising expense should be recovered in rates because,
it was asserted, the advertising had resulted in increased revenues
well in excess of the expense.
ratepayer benefit.

In the Company's view, this was a

The Division and the Committee both argued that

the Company had asserted but failed to demonstrate a causal connection between promotional advertising and additional revenues, and
in no other way had suggested a benefit sufficient to permit
recovery of the expenses in rates. The Commission notes that R750406-1 prohibits recovery of promotional advertising expenses from
ratepayers, unless, under subsection C of that rule, it finds such
advertising to be in the public interest.

In this instance, the

Company has sought to equate what it characterizes as the ratepayer
benefit of speculative increased revenues with the public interest.
This is not sufficient.
The Commission
demonstrate that

finds that the Company has failed to

its promotional advertising

is in the public

interest sufficiently to qualify for a subsection C exemption from
the R750-406 prohibition and will therefore reduce the Company's
expenses by $309,000.
We further find that the Company did not demonstrate that
its promotional advertising produced the additional revenues it
alleged.

Disallowance of these expenses, therefore, necessitates

no change in revenues.
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prevent general corporate overhead costs from being overallocated
to the Company.

The Commission finds that the gross revenues

formula over-allocates general corporate costs to the Company, that
the net revenue formula is a better means of allocating such costs,
and, accordingly, will adopt the Division's position, resulting in
a $575,000 decrease in expenses.

5.

Questar Services 1989 True-Up
Mountain Fuel sought an adjustment of $40,000 to reflect

the January, 1990 adjustment of test-year Questar Service Corporation charges.

The Company argued that the adjustment is necessary

to correct a mistake in the December, 1989 billing.
did not oppose the adjustment.
adjustment

should

be

treated

The Division

The Committee argued that the
consistently

true-ups for Mountain Fuel and disallowed.

with

past

January

The Commission finds

the adjustment acceptable and will allow the $40,000 increase in
expenses•

6.

Interest Synchronization
The

Committee

proposed

an

interest

synchronization

adjustment to provide equal treatment to customers of Option 1 and
Option 2 utilities.

The Committee alleged that failure to adopt

the adjustment for Option 1 utilities (such as Mountain Fuel) would
result in a higher revenue requirement for the Company and rate
discrimination against Option 1 ratepayers.
The Company argued that it will violate federal law if it
applies interest synchronization and will thereby risk tax penalties. In addition, the ratepayers will risk havina the amount of „ r —
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8.

Environmental Clean-Up
The

Company

sought

to

include

in this

case

certain

environmental cleanup expenses incurred at its Salt Lake North
Operation Center.

The Company argued that such cleanup expenses

are appropriately

recovered

in rates because they

ongoing expenses of the Company.
position of the Company.

are normal,

The Division agreed with the

The Committee, however, argued that such

costs are extraordinary, non-recurring and not a normal part of
utility operations.

The Committee pointed out that these cleanup

costs relate to contamination caused from 1908 to 1929 by Utah Gas
& Coke Company's coal gasification

activities, and, therefore,

relate to prior service periods and prior customers.

The Committee

suggested that to allow such costs today would be a violation of
the rule against retroactive ratemaking.
In our Order in Case No. 84-057-07, we said that the
failure of the Company to recover certain expenses in the cost of
service constitutes a risk of conducting utility business for which
the utility is compensated when a rate of return is established for
invested capital.

However, we are cognizant of the fact that this

cleanup was necessitated

by government

regulation

after the events causing the contamination.

enacted long

We consider that such

burdens may be placed upon the Company by government's changing
environmental views from time to time and believe that in this
instance

it

is an unavoidable

expense

for an energy utility.

Therefore, the recommendation of the Committee to disallow these
expenses is rejected..

"^ n <* nv
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length.

The Division offered an adjustment that valued the trans-

action at the average of the original appraisals performed by the
Company and ILC.

It further justified the Brewery property and

improvements average appraisal by calculating the depreciated book
value of this asset transferred from the affiliate to the utility
and arriving at essentially the same value.
The Commission is of the view that transactions involving
affiliates place ratepayers at a disadvantage that can never be
entirely controlled or offset.

For that reason it is generally

appropriate to allow transfers of property from affiliates to the
utility at the lesser of book or market and transfers going the
other way at the greater of book or market.

We find that Mountain

Fuel's property transferred to an affiliate should be valued at the
greater of market or book, while that transferred from an affiliate
to Mountain Fuel should be valued at the lesser of market or book.
We further find reasonable the Company's proposed valuation of the
Sunnyside property on the basis of 30 condominium units per acre.
Therefore we will accept the Division's adjustment as modified by
the Sunnyside changes.

These decisions result in two adjustments,

a decrease in depreciation expenses of $23,000 and a decrease in
rate base of $923,000.

We would note that if the Company had

sought Commission approval of these affiliate transactions at the
time they took place, which approval is required under our 1984
Order approving the reorganization of Questar Corporation, Docket
No. 84-057-10, it would have been in a better position to justify
its actions and/or provide additional data where its position was
inadequately supported.
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the disallowance recommended by the Committee.

We also find that

the burden to justify affiliate transactions is, and must always
be# the utility's.

D.

Cash Working Capital
1.

Lead/Lag Study Results

The basis of the cash working capital requirement
Company's lead/lag study.

is the

The study contains ten broad categories

of revenues and expenses, and each category is associated with
lead/lag day.

The study calculates a net composite lead/lag day as

an average of the individual lead/lag days weighted by the dollar
amount in each respective category.

An average daily cash working

capital requirement is obtained as the product of the net composite
lead/lag day and cost-of-service, divided by 365 days.
two disputed issues concerning the lead/lag study.

There are

The first is

the revenue lag day associated with delinquent accounts and the
second is the expense lead day associated with income tax payments.

a.

Delinquent Accounts

The Company testified that the delinquent account balance
was an average for the entire year and therefore a revenue lag of
365 days should be employed.

The Division took issue with the

Company's use of a 365 revenue lag day.

The Division testified

that due to the lack of quantifiable information caused by the
Company's exclusion of delinquent accounts from its statistical
sampling method, it is appropriate to use a revenue lag day determined as an average of the number of days the accounts were delinnn«* or
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The Committee
removed

from

the

recommended

lead/lag

that delinquent

study.

The

Committee

accounts be
argued

that

Mountain Fuelfs proposal is inconsistent with the treatment requested in its recent Wyoming rate case.

In addition, the proposal

is deficient in that it fails to accurately measure the impact of
delinquent accounts by overlooking offsets such as the customercontributed capital available from the accumulated provision for
uncollectible accounts.
The Commission finds that the analyses of this issue by
the Company and the Committee are not satisfactory and that the
proposal of the Division is the most reasonable.

Therefore a

revenue lag of 125.39 days associated with delinquent accounts
should be applied in this case.

b.

Income Tax Payments

Mountain Fuel proposed an expense lead day associated
with income tax payments, computed from actual 1989 historic test
year payments.

The Division based its factor on statutory due

dates and a June 30th test year mid-point.

According to the

Division, the expense lead day associated with income tax expenses
should not be based on actual results which are the product of
Company estimates but should be based on a fixed payment schedule
throughout
estimates

the year.
unnecessarily

The

Division

increase

argued

cash

that

working

Committee supported the Divisionfs proposal.

the

Companyfs

capital.

The

The Commission finds,

consistent with its decisions in prior cases, that it is appropriate to use statutory due dates to determine the expense lead day
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and therefore an expense lead of 59.32 days should be applied in
this case.

c.

Adjusted Lead/Lag Study Results

The Company adjusted its lead/lag study to incorporate
Commission findings concerning revenue and expense adjustments and
findings with respect to the lead/lag days associated with delinquent accounts and

income tax payments.

The Commission finds

reasonable the adjusted lead/lag study which results in a cash
working capital requirement of $2,824,000.

2.

Compensating Balances
The Company proposed to include in cash working capital

the cash balances required to maintain lines of short-term credit
and cash funds for other administrative purposes.

The Company

argued that these cash balances are assets necessary to the operation of the Company and therefore a return on such balances should
be allowed.

The Division argued that there should be no addition

to rate base for compensating balances because investors know that
funds are required for administrative purposes and their return on
equity

expectations

already

reflect

this

understanding.

The

Committee agreed with the Division that compensating cash balances
should not be allowed as a component of cash working capital.

The

Commission finds, consistent with its decisions in prior cases,
that it is not appropriate to include compensating cash balances in
the determination of cash working capital and therefore rejects the
Company's proposal.
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3.

Require Payment in 23 Days
The

Division

proposed

to

reduce

the

Company's

cash

working capital requirement as a result of its proposal to modify
the

Company's

billing

practices

by

within 23 days after the billing date.

requiring

customer

payment

According to the Division

this reduction in payment period would produce an annual savings in
revenue requirement.
ment

The Company argued that the proposed adjust-

is not known and measurable and the modification to its

billing

practices would

require the addition

of employees and

equipment, and would not be favorably perceived by its customers.
The Committee

testified

that the Divisionfs proposal would be

appropriate only if the 23-day period was fully reflected throughout the determination of cash working capital.

The Commission

finds that the proposal is insufficiently developed in this case
and will not adopt it at this time.

We may revisit this issue

after the task force currently addressing these issues submits its
report.

E.

Rate of Return
1.

Rate of Return on Equity
The position the Company took in this docket is that a

return on common equity above 13 percent is required by investors.
This was the conclusion of its witness, Dr. Williamson, who analyzed a sample of comparable companies primarily by application of
a discounted cash flow (DCF) model to a sample of representative
gas

distribution

utilities.

He

supported

this

analysis with

capital asset pricing model and risk premium tests, and a study of
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Williamson's sample consisted of eight companies which he determined

had operational

Company's.

and risk characteristics

similar to the

Size, service territory degree-days, proportion of

distribution operations, and availability of information were the
factors used to select the sample.

To estimate expected growth, a

key component of the DCF analysis, Dr. Williamson relied on security

analysts' estimates

of

earnings

growth

rates.

Forecasted

growth, added to estimated dividend yield, which he based on next
year's dividend, and applied to the sample companies, then checked
by the Hope and Bluefield and risk premium analyses, yielded the
recommendation.

In prefiled testimony, Dr. Williamson's estimate

of the required return was 13.5 percent.

At hearing's end, the

Company advocated a return above 13 percent.
Division

witness

required return on equity.

Eatmon

recommended

a

12.0

percent

Mr. Eatmon relied on the DCF method,

applying it to several different samples of comparable companies.
His estimate of the DCF growth component was based on forecasts of
earnings and dividend growth rates, equally weighted.

For dividend

yield, he selected 12-month average stock prices, after reviewing
market prices for periods of one, three, six, and twelve months,
and employed
dividend.

an estimate of the next period's expected annual

Application of the DCF model to the comparable companies

resulted in an 11.6 to 12.4 percent range of reasonable estimates
of investor required returns. Mr. Eatmon recommended 12.0 percent.
The

Committee

and

Nucor

Steel

testimony of Dr. Marcus on these issues.

jointly

sponsored

the

Dr. Marcus's DCF analysis

of comparable companies led to his recommendation of 12.2 percent
as

thp

nnQ't- o*P o r n n f v

ranifal
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These witnesses were

in agreement that Mountain Fuel

Supply's actual capital structure should be used in this proceeding.

Though the Company is a subsidiary of a holding company, each

testified that the actual capital structure could be measured in an
acceptable manner and would be appropriate to derive the overall
cost of capital.
We can only determine the cost of capital indirectly, by
assessing expert opinion about the rate of return investors can be
expected to require if they are to purchase equity shares.

This

required market rate of return is hypothetical and is estimable
only through a conscientious, fair-minded exercise of judgment.
Our decisions must afford the utility the opportunity to
earn a fair rate of return.

This is a return which will maintain

the utility1s credit standing and allow it to attract additional
capital, thus assuring its financial integrity.
would

allow

it to achieve earnings comparable to companies of

similar risk.
known*

Also, this return

Such standards guide our decisions and are well

At the heart of our considerations, however, is the pre-

sumption of an efficient, effective management.
The rate of return must not be set so high as to exploit
consumers, however.

Thus, the concept of a fair rate of return

suggests a range or a zone of reasonableness.

A return permitted

within this range will be just and reasonable; earnings within the
range will not be insufficient
consumers.

for the Company

or harmful to

We must balance the interests of owners and customers.

On this record* expert witness testimony places the fair
rate of return at 12.0, 12.2, or 13.5 percent, estimates drawn from
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somewhat broader.

One hundred-fifty basis points separate the

three point estimates.

Each basis point amounts to $23,000 of

revenue requirement.
The evidence shows, and the parties themselves agree,
that each witness testified credibly.

Widely accepted techniques,

though primarily the DCF model, frame their analyses.
The principal value of the DCF or other models presented
on the record is the delimitation and organization of relevant
information.

Sophisticated extension and elaboration of the models

is of doubtful value since it can only obscure the subjectivity,
the careful Commission judgment, that is the deciding factor.

In

this case, the presentation of the models has been straightforward,
without suggestion of an unrealistic precision.
Our orders in recent rate cases reveal growing reliance
on the DCF method.

It is acceptable because it is understandable,

its basis in theory reasonable, its components estimable in our
proceedings, and perhaps above all, its results reliable under a
variety of circumstances.

The same cannot be said of the capital

asset pricing model, which in our proceedings seems immersed in
doubt.

The technique is of questionable reliability and more often

than not has been employed to support a rate of return recommendation much higher than indicated by DCF results.

As with the risk

premium approach, measuring the components is problematical.

While

the DCF method is not free of problems, including circularity—
regulation

authorizes

earnings,

share, from which yield
estimated,

all

then

which

is determined

resulting

in

influence

dividends

per

and the growth rate is

calculated

equity

cost—the
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view typically fall within a narrow range and we have been able to
assess their disagreements.

We therefore reaffirm a previously

stated determination to place little reliance on other methods.
(See Report and Order, Docket Number 88-049-07, October 18,

1989,

pp. 65-67.)
Our first concern is the estimation by the witnesses of
the DCF variables and the samples of comparable firms to which the
method is applied.

Secondly, we will consider other influential

factors.
The discounted cash flow method estimates the investor!s
capitalization or discount rate, the cost of capital, as the sum of
the dividend yield and the expected dividend growth rate.

Current

dividend per share is divided by current market price to obtain
dividend yield.

There is some disagreement concerning the proper

dividend and price to use, but the more significant disputes arise
over the estimation of the dividend growth rate.
In

theory,

the

DCF model

requires

a dividend

yield

calculated for the point in time that cost of capital is determined, that is, current annual dividend divided by current market
price.

Short-term fluctuations in market price can affect the cost

of capital determination unduly, however, so each witness used a
price averaged over a period of time determined to be representative.

The dividend used was adjusted to reflect the next period's

expected annual dividend by each witness, but the Committee and the
Division witnesses both criticized Dr. Williamson's next period
yield adjustment as unsupportably high.
The estimation of a dividend growth rate is problematical
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used earnings growth rate forecasts as the basis for his dividend
growth rate estimate.

He described DCF as working best "when both

earnings and dividends are in a smooth upward trend and when
forecasts of growth are consistent," and asserted this was true for
his sample of eight companies.

Both Committee and Division wit-

nesses criticized his approach.
growth

patterns,

growth

in

Dr. Marcus analyzed historic

retained

earnings,

and

reviewed

analysts' opinions in his effort to estimate expected dividend
growth rates.

He asserted that Dr. Williamson had been unduly

influenced by analysts1
growth behavior.

opinions and had not analyzed historic

Moreover, two firms in the Williamson sample of

eight show unrealistically high growth rates, 22 percent for one
and 15 percent for the other.

Division witness Eatmon estimated a

dividend growth rate based on both earnings and dividend growth
forecasts.

He testified that the Company used unrealistic earnings

growth projections as the basis for its DCF dividend growth rate.
Both Division and Committee witnesses recommended rejecting this
aspect of Williamson's DCF analysis, and stated this would bring
the Company's DCF result down from 13-14 percent to near 12 percent, virtually the same as they had obtained.
Each witness applied the DCF model to sample companies,
but differed as to the correct sample.
comparable

According to Dr. Marcus,

firms are few in number and the use of reasonable

measures of risk resulted in a sample that was too small to be
useful.

He therefore used the Moody's gas distribution group of

firms, abandoning a risk analysis.

Dr. Williamson employed several

measures of risk and comparability to select his eight-company
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Moody's group, according to Dr. Marcus, and use of the size measure
results in a different sample.

Dr. Marcus criticized the use of

size as a measure and asserted that no systematic relationship
between size and risk exists.

He also questioned Dr. Williamson's

use of degree-days as a risk factor, stating that whether fewer
degree-days correlates with lower risk depends upon volatility of
weather and a utilityfs ability to deal with it.
was

not

presented.

Division witness

samples, including one consisting of

f

Eatmon

Such an analysis
examined

several

A' rated companies.

The

Division argued Dr. Williamson's sample did not yield reasonable
results, whereas the Division's more encompassing analysis did.
The main problem identified with the Williamson sample, according
to the Committee, is the inclusion of one company with a DCF cost
of capital estimate of 25 percent.

It was asserted that a company

having a market-required return of 25 percent bears no relation to
Mountain Fuel Supply and does not belong in a sample.
We can only accept Dr. Williamson's DCF results in part.
The critique offered by the Division and the Committee witnesses is
persuasive in three important respects.

First, the adjustment to

bring the dividend to the next period is excessive.

Second, the

sample of firms contains at least one company that, arguably, is
not comparable, producing an upward bias in the dividend growth
rate estimate.

And third, reliance upon earnings growth rate

forecasts to estimate the dividend growth rate also imparts an
upward bias.

A cost of equity estimate near those of the other two

witnesses is obtained when corresponding adjustments are made.
this basis, we find the cost of equity to be 12.2 percent.

On
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There are reasons why the cost of equity obtained from a
model may differ from a fair rate of return allowance.

Where we

wish to compensate for outstanding management performance, or to
provide an incentive for efficiency, or to compensate for extraordinary risk, we can do so by setting a return greater than the
minimum cost of equity.

The converse of this is also true.

We can

adjust where we have reason to believe management has not adequately met its public service obligations.
The record contains no evidence suggesting that Mountain
Fuel Supply Company is either more or less risky than comparable
gas distribution companies, and Dr. Williamson so testified.

Nor

is there any evidence suggesting that the Company suffers from
attrition; i.e., the adverse effects of inflation to which management is unable to adjust.
benefit

The record suggests, though without

of systematic examination, that Company management has

performed very well in most respects.

In two areas, however,

affiliate relationships and gas supply planning, we take issue with
the management of the Company's parent, Questar Corporation.
The record shows that this company has organized and
reorganized during the 1970s and 1980s in order to capitalize on
market opportunities, to simplify its relationship with federal and
state regulatory entities, to clarify its activities for shareholders, and for other reasons best known to management.

In 1984,

docket number 84-057-10, we permitted the formation of a holding
company structure, with the utility we regulate as a subsidiary.
This approval was conditional, however, and the conditions were to
ensure that we could continue to regulate the utility in the public
interest.

Evidence on this record, however, strongly suggests a
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deliberate
generally

shift

of

risk

from

Questar

to the distribution utility

customers.

Corporation

operations

and thence to its core

Affiliate relationships have constrained and inhibited

the pursuit of least-cost gas supply by the distribution utility.
Though Questar Pipeline Company's rates and rate structure can
adversely affect the distribution utility and its core customers,
the utility has never intervened to represent these interests at
FERC cases where such rates are determined.

We find no convincing

evidence of an attempt to simulate an arms-length relationship with
Questar

Corporation

subsidiaries,

or

better,

overcome the inherent lack of such a relationship.

to

deliberately

The chief case

in point is the assumption by an affiliated company having interests demonstrably different from the utilityfs of the utilityfs gas
supply planning, acquisition, and dispatch functions. These issues
are all discussed at greater length in Section III, pages 34-43.
In our judgment these actions do not protect the interests of the
utility's customers. We determine, therefore, to impose an adjustment in the form of a reduction in the allowed rate of return of 10
basis points.
In summary, we find that the utility's cost of equity
capital as determined, in the main, by various discounted cast flow
analyses, is 12.2 percent.

The equity rate of return which we find

to be just and reasonable, is 12.1 percent.

2.

Capital Structure and Rate of Return on Rate Base
The cost of capital may vary with the debt-equity ratio.

For this reason and others, we have at times adopted a hypothetical
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suggested

by

sample

companies.

This

capital

structure would

insulate utility customers from the potentially adverse effects of
subsidiary operations, from management financial decisions that
might increase the cost of obtaining capital, and from the problem
of measuring an actual capital structure for a utility that is a
subsidiary

of a holding company.

Adoption of a hypothetical

capital structure is an adjustment similar to the disallowance of
any unreasonable expense.

There are, however, arguments to be

considered why a hypothetical capital

structure should not be

adopted.
In the present docket no witness has opened the door to
these difficult matters.

Each testified that the utilityfs actual

capital structure should be used to determine the overall rate of
return.

It was also clear on the record that the Companyfs actual

capital

struture was within the range of hypothetical capital

structures calculated from a reasonable sample of companies.

All

p>arties used the same capital structure component weights and
costs, with the exception of the cost of equity capital, to derive
the overall rate of return recommended.

Substituting the cost of

equity we have determined to be reasonable, 12.1 percent, produces
an overall rate of return of 11.03 percent.
be fair, just and reasonable.

We find this rate to

We will note, however, a concern

with the costs of debt and preferred stock in this capital structure, and request the Division to conduct an examination to determine if these costs might be reduced.
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F.

Revenue Requirement Summary
The following table summarizes the revenue requirement

determinations reached in this proceeding.

It presents the deriva-

tion of a revenue requirement deficiency of $76,000.

SYSTEM COST BY FUNCTION
ADJUSTED TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 1989
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
($000)
TOTAL
RATE
BASE

OPERATING EXPENSES
(1)

TOTAL
COSTS
(2)

(3)

WYOMING
PRODUCTION
(4)

UTAH

(*)

(6

1. Operation & Maintenance Expenses

76,297

2,308

3,708

70,281

2. Depreciation, Depletion & Amortiiation

17,215

3,716

765

12,734

3. Taxes (Excluding Income Taxes)

7,801

113

462

7,226

4. Colorado Credits

(353)

(353)

100,960

5,784

4,935

90,241

13,204

2,295

708

10,201

5,818

5.
6.

TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(Distributed on Rate Base Basis)

RETURN
(Distributed on Rate Base Basis)
7. Production

52,745

5,818

8. Distribution - Wyoming

16,279

1,796

234,462

25,860

303,586

33,474

5,818

1,796

25,860

147,638

13,897

7,439

126,302

95 21%

0

1

13,231

0

126,302

9.

- Utah

10.

TOTAL RETURN @

11.

System Non-Gas Costs

JLI. 03%

12.

Utah percent = >

13.

Utah costs

= >

139,533

14.

TOTAL UTAH REV

139,457

15.

UTAH DEFICIENCY

76

1,796
25,860
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III.

A.

DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS
WITH RESPECT TO GAS SUPPLY

The Gas Supply Function
The Division's consultants, Theodore Barry and Associates

("Barry"), performed a qualitative examination of the management
and

technical

activities

aspects of the gas supply planning

of Mountain

Fuel

Supply

and

its

and related

affiliates.

The

Committee's consultants, Exeter Associates ("Exeter"), reviewed the
gas supply procurement

arrangements of Mountain Fuel

for con-

sistency with a least-cost acquisition strategy.
The gas supply function can be segmented into four interrelated areas: load forecasting, design day analysis, gas supply
planning, and gas supply dispatch.

Mountain Fuel's Forecasting and

Load Research Department develops both load forecasts and design
day estimates.

Beginning with the 1990 planning cycle, Mountain

Fuel has stated these forecasts will normally be for ten years.
According to Barry, the management process involved in
load forecasting and in formulating the design day estimate appear
to be reasonable and consistent with industry practice.

Further,

Mountain Fuel does do a reasonably good technical job of forecasting the loads of the residential sector.

Because the residential

sector is its most important load, Barry concluded that it is
likely that Mountain Fuel's cost of service is not substantially
higher than it would be with better gas load forecasting.

In

addition, the technical considerations of design day for Mountain
Fuel as a distribution utility are rather straightforward such that
either the design day issue does not really exist at the Mountain
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Fuel level or it is significantly less of a technical issue than it
is at Questar Pipeline Company.
Questar Pipeline develops and prepares a gas supply plan
for all gas to be delivered to Mountain Fuel under the terms of the
Gas Supply, Odorization and Operating Services Agreement between
Mountain Fuel and Questar Pipeline.

The written policy of Questar

Pipeline filed at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
essentially says that Questar Pipeline will use its best efforts in
consideration of all its operating and contractual requirements to
provide its jurisdictional customer, Mountain Fuel, with reliable
supplies at the lowest achievable cost.
Mountain Fuel has two sources of gas supply, its own
production and contract purchases from Questar Pipeline at rates
established by the FERC.

Mountain Fuel is Questar Pipelined only

sales customer and Questar Pipeline is the only source of contract
purchases for Mountain Fuel.

Mountain Fuelfs own production is

operated by WEXPRO, a Questar affiliate, under the terms of the
WEXPRO Agreement.

For planning purposes, WEXPRO supplies Mountain

Fuel with reserve and deliverability estimates of Mountain Fuelfs
own production.

Mountain Fuel determines the quantity of such

reserves expected to be produced by WEXPRO during the planning
period.
Mountain

Fuel

supplies

its gas

load

and

design day

forecasts, along with the desired production from Mountain Fuel's
own sources to Questar Pipeline.

Questar Pipeline incorporates the

Mountain Fuel information with Questar Pipeline data relating to
reserves, deliverability, and contractual requirements of purchase
eras

finurr.PS.

The
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("Celsius"),
production

an e x p l o r a t i o n

and p r o d u c t i o n

subsidiary

is p u r c h a s e d b y Q u e s t a r P i p e l i n e

all of

for r e s a l e t o

whose

Mountain

Fuel.
Questar
economic

optimization

model.

The

review,

Pipeline

gas

determines

model,

supply

the

plan

further modification,

Pipeline.

monthly

gas

Gas

supply

Contract

is

returned

and

ultimate

plan

using

("GCA")

Analyzer

to

Mountain

agreement

an

Fuel

with

for

Questar

Q u e s t a r P i p e l i n e t h e n i m p l e m e n t s t h e p l a n b y m e a n s of a

non-optimization
Mountain

a

Fuel

model,

the

Gas

monitors

the

implementation

written

reports

and

Dispatch

review

and

Cost

of

meetings

(GDC)

the
and

model.

plan

through

daily

dispatch

review meetings.
According
develop
tivity

strategy

to

to

Mountain

deal

with

s t u d i e s and a n a l y z i n g

the model

is n o t w e l l

suited

Fuel,

the

uncertainty

GCA
by

contingencies.

model

is

used

undertaking

sensi-

Mountain Fuel

for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t

to

claimed

of an annual

gas

s u p p l y p l a n and t h e r e is n o t a f o c u s on o n e s p e c i f i c G C A r e s u l t

as

an o p t i m i z e d s o l u t i o n t o b e r e p l i c a t e d b y t h e G D C m o d e l .
Both Barry and Exeter claimed that Questar Pipeline's
of t h e G C A m o d e l d i d n o t p r o v i d e a l e a s t - c o s t g a s s u p p l y p l a n ,
Mountain

Fuel personnel

did not possess

a technical

They

also

pipeline

lacked

stated
supplier

that
and

oversight
Mountain
the

fact

and

control

Fuel's
that

of Questar

lack

it

of

does

not

Mountain
Pipeline.

oversight

for

Mountain

Fuel

is

cruite

crood

-in f^af

its

either

industry.

According to Barry, the gas dispatch performed by
Pipeline

of

purchase

s p o t o r o t h e r m a r k e t g a s is r e l a t i v e l y u n i q u e in t h e

that

understanding

of t h e G C A m o d e l a n d its u s e b y Q u e s t a r P i p e l i n e , a n d t h a t
Fuel management

use

Questar
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instructions developed by the GDC implement well what the GCA
calculates to be the gas supply plan.
Although disputed issues remain among the parties concerning the gas supply planning function, the Commission finds that
possible improvements in the load forecasting, the design day estimate , and the gas dispatch functions, while desirable, are unlikely
to substantially reduce the annual costs of gas supply*

B.

Corporate Organization and Affiliate Relations
The current form of corporate organization reflects the

corporate

objective

regulation,

with

Commission,

its

of

reducing

Mountain
sister

Fuel

what

it views

subject

affiliate

to

Questar

as

duplicative

regulation
Pipeline

by

this

subject

to

regulation by the FERC, and WEXPRO, unregulated.
Mountain Fuel contracts with Questar Pipeline and WEXPRO
are effectively cost-plus contracts.

The only oversight Mountain

Fuel has of Questar Pipeline is through FERC regulation and two
independent monitors provide oversight of WEXPRO.
Mountain Fuel stated that decisions regarding gas supply
often involve conflicts between the interests of Mountain Fuel and
Questar Pipeline.

When such conflicts of interest do arise, they

are resolved within Questar Corporation.

Since disputes are effec-

tively resolved by the corporate parent, independent arms-length
transactions and adversarial relationships cannot be expected to
occur among affiliated economic entities.
Mountain Fuel further stated that any major proposal that
Questar Pipeline makes at the FERC is the result of internal
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only one of which is Mountain Fuel.

The proposals it makes at the

FERC are the result of internal consensus and attempt to balance
the interests of the various entities involved#

including the

shareholders of Questar Corporation.
Recent Questar Pipeline cost-of-service and rate design
issues at the FERC have resulted in a shift of costs from other
customers of Questar Pipeline to Mountain Fuel.

Mountain Fuel has

never participated at FERC in a Questar Pipeline rate proceeding.
The Division, not Mountain Fuel, intervenes at FERC on behalf of
Mountain Fuel's ratepayers.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
current organizational structure of Questar Corporation and pattern
of regulation provide an opportunity for Mountain Fuel to bear a
disproportionate share of the risks facing Questar Corporation and,
in particular, for Questar Pipeline to subsidize its activities in
other markets by shifting costs to Mountain Fuel.

Further, inter-

affiliate agreements and regulatory oversight of affiliates are not
a substitute for utility management oversight and control.

C.

The GCA Gas Planning Model and its Use by Questar Pipeline
The objective of the gas supply plan provided by the GCA

model is to minimize the net present value of gas acquisition costs
consistent with supply reliability over the planning horizon.
model

is limited by a number of operational

The

requirements and

constraints, and the forecast information available to the company
at the time the plan was prepared.

Operational requirements and

constraints include the use of Mountain Fuel's own production,
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must-take purchase contracts with Questar Pipeline, and the use of
Questar Pipeline storage.
Mountain Fuel's own production is not subject to optimization within the model but is exogenous to the model.

Mountain

Fuel stated what it has done is consistent with the stipulation
reached with the Division.

Mountain Fuel stated that in the future

it would like to investigate the modeling of economic optimization
of its own production.
Exeter agreed with the testimony of Division witness
Darrell Hanson concluding that prices of gas obtained under the
WEXPRO

Agreement

compare

favorably

with

alternative

sources.

However, Exeter expressed concern that Mountain Fuel has little
control over when WEXPRO decides to develop new wells and the
supply of gas forthcoming from such wells in relation to Mountain
Fuel's demand needs and other supply options.
The GCA models all gas supplies as contracts requiring
the aggregation of data describing approximately 1,700 individual
wells into 30 contract or well groups for use by the GCA.

The data

provided to Barry by Questar Pipeline segmented wells on the basis
of load factor thus preventing the GCA model from optimizing across
well groups with respect to price.

Mountain Fuel claimed the data

provided to Barry was in the process of being updated for use by a
new version of the GCA.

No party disputed the need for segmenting

well groups on the basis of price as well as load factor.
Originally
issues.

the

GCA

model

did

not

treat

take-or-pay

Mountain Fuel designed a method for modeling take-or-pay

in which the objective is to reduce Questar Pipeline's exposure to
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take-or-pay penalty rates in order to constrain the model to deal
with must-take sources of gas supply, thus passing take-or-pay
liabilities of Questar Pipeline on to Mountain Fuel.

There is no

provision in the GCA model which allows a buy-out or buy-down of
take-or-pay liabilities.
Spot market purchases were effectively eliminated as a
feasible alternative since, if a unit of spot gas is taken, the
full amount of the the take-or-pay liability on the gas that is not
taken must be paid in full.
The model constrains the use of storage consistent with
FERC-imposed dates that permit Questar Pipeline to take and replace
gas from storage.

Questar Pipeline provides storage as a part of

firm sales or transportation service.

Questar Pipeline's storage

costs are recovered in FERC firm sales (CD-I) and transportation
(T-l) rates.

Questar Pipeline does not provide unbundled storage

service.
Since Questar Pipeline does not offer unbundled storage,
the model does not contain as a feasible alternative Mountain Fuel
purchases

from

independent

third parties with Questar Pipeline

providing transportation and storage service.

The sole source of

gas supply to Mountain Fuel beyond its own production is Questar
Pipeline.

The Kern River and WyCal pipeline proposals are not

considered feasible sources of supply due to the low load factor of
Mountain Fuelfs demand and the need for storage to serve such a low
load

factor customer.

Although FERC determines the timing of

storage use and the method by which storage costs are recovered in
rates,

such

determinations

can

be

changed

in

future

FERC
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Actual historical data was not available to Barry thus
preventing
operating
Pipeline.

Barry

from

quantifying

in a manner different

the effect

on gas costs of

from that modeled

by Questar

Further, no party recommended an adjustment to revenue

requirement as a result of analyzing the GCA model and its use by
Questar Pipeline.
The Commission finds that the use of the GCA model by
Questar Pipeline may not provide a long term least-cost integrated
resource plan.

The Mountain Fuel contracts with Questar Pipeline

and WEXPRO are cost-plus contractsf and are not the result of armslength transactions but result from a single economic interest.
Mountain Fuel's own production and contract purchases from Questar
Pipeline are. the only sources of gas supply treated in the GCA
model.
lacking.
pay

Economic optimization of Mountain Fuel's own production is
The GCA model excludes FERC reconsideration of take-or-

liabilities or use of storage over the planning horizon.

Finally, spot market and independent third party sources are not
supply options, and demand side considerations are absent.

D. Conclusions
The Commission finds that the current practice of the gas
supply planning and purchase functions residing within Questar
Pipeline is not in the public interest.
We recognize that there may be problems with implementing
these functions within Mountain Fuel.

The current unavailability

of unbundled storage and transportation in the tariffs set by FERC
for Questar Pipeline is one such problem which comes immediately to
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implementing

changes in the gas supply planning and purchasing

functions.
The Commission has two primary goals in consideration of
the gas supply planning function.

The first goal is to create a

method which duplicates arms-length transactions between Mountain
Fuel and the Questar family of companies.

The second goal is to

design a method, for the long term, to provide the lowest priced
gas

supply

to Mountain

Fuel ratepayers without

any regard to

corporate structure or the needs of the corporate parent or affiliates.

In light of these goals, the Commission finds that the gas

planning function of Mountain Fuel should be moved from Questar
Pipeline to Mountain Fuel.
Two events present an opportunity for Mountain Fuel to be
considering what its future options are: 1) take-or-pay liabilities
or take requirements that present take-or-pay liabilities come to
an end in the 1993-94 timeframe; and 2) complete deregulation of
gas occurs in 1993. A review of a long-term least-cost integrated
resource plan for Mountain Fuel cannot be made in 1993 when Questar
Pipeline has already made commitments to continue to fulfill its
function and responsibilities to Mountain Fuel.
Commission

Therefore the

finds that Mountain Fuel is to provide a long-term

least-cost integrated resource plan within six months for review by
the Commission and other interested parties.

Mountain Fuel is to

provide the funding necessary, as pre-approved by the Commission,
to allow the Division and the Committee to contract with consultants for a management audit follow-up.

The Commission will

allow inclusion of such funding as an expense in the 191 Account.
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The Commission further finds that a task force is to be
established to consider the various issues that have arisen in this
case.

Issues to be considered shall include but need not be

limited to the following:
1.

How the gas planning

function

is to be

returned to

Mountain Fuel;
2.

Recommendations

of

Barry

concerning

load

forecasting,

design day estimation, and gas supply dispatch;
3.

Recommendations of Barry and Exeter concerning the use of
the GCA model;

4.

Cost/benefit analyses of relaxing model constraints;

5.

Possible changes in FERC regulation necessary to increase
the feasible options of Mountain Fuel and/or reduce the
limitations of constraints including, among other issues,
the availability of transportation service, the use of
storage, the unbundling of storage service, the possible
buy-down of take-or-pay liabilities, and the availability
of spot market sources;

6.

The investment incentives facing WEXPRO and the resulting
economic impact on Mountain Fuel;

7.

The maintenance of a historical data base and recommendations for annual review of gas supply decisions; and

8.

The relevance and applicability of planning and dispatch
models to the development of an annual gas supply plan
for ratemaking purposes.
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IV. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO
RATE SPREAD AND RATE DESIGN

A.

Stipulated Cost of Service and Rate Design
Cost of service and most rate design issues in this

docket were resolved by a stipulation of the parties that we
tentatively accepted on September 5, 1990, and finally approve with
this order.

B.

A copy is appended.

Disputed Issues
1.

General Service (GS) Rate Design
Three general service rate design proposals were present-

ed which if accepted would alter customer charge and block elements
of the rate.

Currently, the rate consists of a $5 customer charge

and two declining blocks.

Division witness Compton proposed to

replace the two blocks with three in order to better track intraclass cost-of-service differences tending to harm larger customers.
He also proposed a summer/winter differential in GS-1 rates based
on seasonal gas cost differences.
the customer service charge to $6.

The Company proposed increasing
The Committee opposed both the

Company's $6 customer charge and, testifying on the importance of
price signals for conservation, the Divisionfs three-block recommendation, suggesting a flattened two-block structure instead.

The

Committee also opposed the summer/ winter differential, in part, on
grounds that low-income households would be harmed by it.
Our rate design decisions are guided by a number of
objectives including efficiency, conservation, equity, stability,
and simplicity.

We have described these at length in the past and
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wish to say here only that the objectives may be in conflict at
times.

Cost-of-service based rates are an important means of

attaining equity and efficiency, and, some would argue, conservation as well.
We have no desire to change rates just for the sake of
having done it.

In this docket, we must change them as to amount;

structure is another matter.

Rates for general service customers

will go up for three reasons: increased commodity costs in the
pass-through part of this proceeding (see Report and Order, Docket
Nos.

90-057-02, 90-057-07, October

31,

1990);

the

stipulation

redresses an inequity which shifts costs from interruptible transportation

customers to general

service customers; and a small

increase in revenue requirement.
General service rate structure changes have been presented to us as proposals to make rates more closely conform to the
costs of providing service, thereby addressing intraclass inequity
and sending the proper price signals about seasonal variation in
gas costs.

These are small changes and not the only way to address

the problem.

They are also controversial proposals, and have in

fact been opposed in this proceeding, including substantial opposition by public witnesses.

They raise questions about which rate-

making objectives might be attained and which not.

For instance,

not all parties define conservation in the same way and, given
this, oppose a declining block rate, however much it may be costbased.

Rate stability is also a concern.

Simplicity and under-

standability are also rate design objectives, and both would be
confounded by the introduction of an increased customer charge, a
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In our judgment, now is not the time to implement these
changes.

By accepting the stipulation on cost of service and rate

design, we have resolved some matters and opened the door to
others.

We require a dispassionate examination of rate structure,

which permits alternatives to be identified and analyzed.

We find

that the increase in customer charge, the change from a two-block
declining rate, and the summer/winter differential should not be
implemented at this time.

2.

Utah Energy Office Proposal
The Utah Energy Office ("UEO") has proposed what it calls

an

"Energy

Efficiency

Tariff" for interruptible

("IT") customers of Mountain Fuel Supply.

transportation

In order to qualify for

service under this tariff, IT customers would have to submit a
brief plan committing three cents per decatherm of expected usage
toward direct natural gas efficiency improvements.

The UEO pro-

vided only general guidelines of how the proposal would be implemented, and this lack of specificity raised concerns among the
various

industrial

intervenors who stated that the record was

insufficient to support the need for and merit of the proposal.
The UEO based its proposal on two major premises. First,
the current relatively

low cost for transported

gas does not

provide sufficient incentives for energy efficiency measures or
proper market signals as to the risk of significantly higher future
gas prices.

Second, since the IT customers may retain the option

of returning to the system as interruptible sales customers at
average cost pricing, they are not fully exposed to the risk of a
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customers to under-invest in energy efficiency/conservation to the
potential

future

detriment

of

other

customers

and

society

in

general.
The

Commission

recognizes

the

problem

that

existing

market signals may not be sufficient to adequately provide longterm incentives for cost-effective investment in energy efficiency.
They may also not promote global competitiveness of United States
(or Utah) companies.

This is a problem which must be addressed,

both nationally and locally.
It is not clear, however, that the IT customers, with
their relatively high load factors, will ever wish to return to
interruptible sales customer status given the impact on average gas
costs of the lower load factor GS-1 customers.
agreed, and the Commission

The parties have

concurs, that this issue should be

analyzed in a future proceeding.
The Commission has the statutory authority to encourage
the conservation of resources and energy in determining just and
reasonable rates under Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1.

Notwithstanding

the sketchy nature of the Energy Office proposal, the Commission
would

perhaps

have

considered

implementing

it,

or

a

similar

proposal in this case were it not for the fact that we are adopting
a cost-of-service stipulation in this case, signed by all parties
including the Utah Energy Office.

This proposal would alter the

result of that stipulation which we have adopted.

As we have

indicated in Docket No. 90-2035-01, the least-cost planning proceeding

for

PacifiCorp,

it

is

appropriate

to

address

future

capacity and energy needs during a period of relative excess supply
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Similarly it is appropriate for the Commission to address future
supply

and

demand

issues,

including

efficient

utilization

of

natural gas supplied or transmitted by Mountain Fuel Supply, during
the current period of relative demand and supply balance in natural
gas markets.
We commend the Utah Energy Office for bringing energy
efficiency issues forward at this time.

In the rate design portion

of this order, we rejected GS-1 tariff concepts which would,
perhaps, send a better signal to customers to invest in energy
efficiency.

This, not because the Commission rejects consideration

of such concepts, but rather that a more comprehensive look at
rates and energy efficiency is appropriate before the changes are
made.

We have elsewhere in this order determined that we will

initiate an integrated resource planning effort for Mountain Fuel
Supply.

We hereby find that the Utah Energy Office proposal will

not be adopted in this docket, but will request that the Utah
Energy Office consider its proposal in the integrated resource plan
context and participate in that process.

The potential may exist

for additional "windows of opportunity" for a program, such as the
one proposed by the Utah Energy Office,

in future cases.

The

Commission will require that it be analyzed within the broader
implications of efficiency incentives for all ratepayers prior to
implementation.
ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The Company file revised schedules and tariffs reflecting
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calculated to result in annual revenues of $139,533,000 and yield
an overall annual return of 11.03 percent beginning December 1,
1990.
2.

The

stipulation

proposed

by

the parties

on cost-of-

service and the rate design issues in this case is approved and
adopted as appended hereto.
3.

The Company henceforth assume and carry the burden of

justifying all interaffiliate transactions that bear on rates and
services in all future proceedings.
4.

The Company's actual capital structure is adopted, but we

order that the Division

shall conduct

an examination

of that

capital structure to determine whether or not the costs of debt and
preferred stock can be reduced.
5.

The gas-planning

function presently performed

for the

Company by Questar Pipeline shall be transferred to the Company.
6.

The Company shall provide the Commission, Division and

interested parties with a long-term, least-cost integrated resource
plan within six months of this Order.
7.

The Division shall establish a task force hereafter to

consider various issues arising in this case which shall include
but not be limited to the issues set forth on page 43.
8.

To

the

extent

that

the

Commission

has

inadvertently

omitted from the ordering provisions of this Order any duty or
obligation intended to be imposed upon the Company or Division,
which duty or obligation is otherwise clear from the language of
the the preceding portions of this Order, it is hereby incorporated
herein by this reference and made a part hereof.
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9.

Any

party,

or any

stockholder,

bondholder,

or other

person pecuniarily interested in the Company may apply for rehearing of any matter determined herein. The application for rehearing
must be filed within 30 days after the issue date of this Order. An
application for rehearing not granted by the Commission within 20
days after filing is denied. If the application for rehearing is
denied, a petition seeking judicial review of any matter determined
in the

Order must

be

filed within

30 days

of the date the

application is denied.
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 21st day of November,
1990.

- -' / fli^g^
Br i a n ' T . S t e w a r t ,

fchairman

j vu.

Japies M. Byrne, Commissioner
Stephen F. Mecham, Commissioner
Attest:

C.IW#

Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary

CONCURRENCE OF CHAIRMAN BRIAN T. STEWART AND DISSENT IN PART
I cannot concur with the decision of my fellow commissioners rejecting the 10 percent disallowance for affiliate transactions proposed by the Committee.

In the last U.S. West rate

case, docket number 88-049-07, the Commission expressed its con- — - -~ —»
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affiliated

transactions

falls

squarely

upon

the

utility.

We

further stated that we would look at the reasonableness with which
the utility responded to efforts by regulators to obtain information about affiliate transactions (referred to in this case as the
attitude test).

In my view, the Company failed both tests.

The first test was clearly not met by the Company inasmuch as it made practically no effort to substantiate the reasonableness

of

Company,

the

its

affiliate

Division

transactions.

undertook

Fortunately

a comprehensive

look

for the
at such

transactions, sufficient to satisfy my fellow commissioners.

I

believe that the utilities that we regulate must be on notice that
inasmuch as they control the corporate structure which they choose
to use, as well as the inter-affiliate transactions made, that the
burden must
affiliate

fall totally upon them to justify each and every

transaction—which

transactions

presumption of suspicion and self-serving.

are

encumbered

by

a

Utilization of already

stretched regulatory resources to seek-and-find-something-wrong is
unacceptable to me.

Regulators should only be required to review

the affirmative case made by the utility.
It has been asserted that the Company passed the attitude
test because it willingly made available whatever the Division
requested.

I believe that this assertion failed to take into

account the Motion to Compel that the Division was forced to file
in May of this year, and the effort of the Company to use tr n
affiliate shield as justification for not making the appropriate
gas supply models and necessary data available to the Division and
the Committee.

Though this was an isolated incident, in my mind it
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I

believe

my

fellow

commissioners

have

been

unduly

patient with the Company on this issue, and I believe the Company
should be grateful for their tolerance.

4

Ob.

Bri

>/&(/

T. Stewart, Chairman
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APPENDIX

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OP UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RATES
AND TARIFFS OF MOUNTAIN FUEL
SUPPLY COMPANY

]|
;
)
|
|

CASE NO. 89-057-15
STIPULATION REGARDING RATE
DESIGN AND COST ALLOCATION
ISSUES

The undersigned parties hereby enter into the following
Stipulation regarding Rate Design and Cost Allocation Issues in
this case.

The undersigned parties jointly move the Commission

to approve and adopt this Settlement in its entirety.
This Stipulation, if accepted by the Commission, will
resolve most of the rate design and cost allocation issues raised
by the parties in this case.

It employs the company's cost of

service and rate design proposals, with stated modifications.
Attached as Exhibit "A" is a cost of service allocation
reflecting the parties' agreement.

As soon as practicable,

Mountain Fuel Supply Company will prepare and supply to all
parties and the Commission the tariff modifications that will be
required as a result of this Stipulation.
The only rate design and tariff issues not resolved by
this Stipulation are the GS-1 rate design, a winter/summer
commodity rate differential and an Energy Efficiency
Transportation Tariff.

This Stipulation doe

not address issues

relating to revenue requirement, rate of return, affiliated
interests or gas procurement.
» W J-u2dp. gad
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I.

ISSUES ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED

The parties have reached agreement on, and request
Commission approval of, the following issues:
A.

Rate Design,
1.

The functionalization, classification,

allocation and rate design principles embodied in the Application
and testimony of Mountain Fuel Supply Company (the "Company")
have been utilized, except as indicated herein.-

Among other

things, the Company's treatment of distribution mains has been
retained.

Changes from current tariffs and practices which are

included in the Company's filing, and adopted in this
Stipulation, include a consolidated interruptible sales class
(Rate Schedule I), a consolidated interruptible transportation
class (Rate Schedule IT), and the apportionment of production
costs on a volumetric basis to sales customers only.
2.
and 55% commodity.

Feeder main costs are classified 45% demand
The demand component has been allocated on

allocation base 1 (peak day) and the commodity component has been
allocated on allocation base 2 (volume).
3.

The distribution system related non-gas costs

and pipeline related non-gas costs have been eliminated from the
F-3 commodity charge, and the commodity charge has been
calculated using cost of service principles.
4.

The definition of "winter" season for all

allocation and pricing purposes has been changed to November 1 March 31.
«r« /<r-u2do.itad
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5,

Administrative and General Expenses are

allocated to each customer class on a pro rata basis, by using a
weighted class allocator which is based on the allocation of the
sum of the five distribution cost sub-functions (e.g. Feeders,
Large Diameter Mains, Network Costs, Meter Reading, and OnPremise Service).
B.

Tariff Issues,
1.

The 2,000 Dth/day contract maximum has been

eliminated from the F-3 tariff (§ 2.05, F-3(c)).
2.

The qualifying period for waiver of the five

cent surcharge in the IT tariff (§ 3.17(1)(3)) has been changed
to November 1 - March 31.
3.

Issues raised by certain industrial

intervenors regarding the minimum load factor charge in the IT
tariff (§ 3.17(j); §3.15(f)) will not be considered in this case.
4.

The 100 Dth/day minimum in Mountain Fuel

Supply Company's proposed IT tariff (§2.10-IT(a)) has been
eliminated.
5.

The parties agree that issues relating to

whether, and at what cost, transportation customers can convert
back to interruptible sales customers should not be resolved in
this case and may be reserved for a future docket.
II.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The only rate design and tariff issues not resolved by
this Stipulation are as follows:

A.

The customer service charge and rate design for

the GS-1 class*
B*

A winter/summer commodity rate differential.

€•

An Energy Efficiency Transportation Tariff.
III.

A.

OTHER ISSUES

This Stipulation is intended by the parties to be

an integrated settlement for purposes of this case of all of the
rate design and cost allocation issues addressed herein.

If the

Commission does not approve all or any part of the issues
resolved in Section I of this Settlement, no party shall be bound
by this Settlement, each party shall be free to support any
position on rate design and cost allocation issues, and this
Settlement Agreement, and all documents, discussions and
negotiations relating to the same, shall be privileged and not
admissible for any purpose.
B.

The parties agree to support this Stipulation in

good faith and to urge Commission approval of the same. The
parties shall submit testimony to explain and support this
Stipulation and the unresolved issues.
C.

Execution of this Stipulation by any party shall

not constitute an acknowledgement or acceptance of the validity
or invalidity of any particular method, theory, or principle of
ratemaking or allocation in any other or future case.
D#

This Stipulation may be executed in one or more

counterparts and, upon execution, each executed counterpart shall
be part of the same agreement as though all parties had executed
-4/"N /A *~1 #-* *

the same document. Any signature page may be detached from any
counterpart without impairing the legal effect of any signatures
and may be attached to another counterpart of this Stipulation.
DATED this XJLhd

day of

, 1990.

(LULAIIZ^T

7
Gary G. Sackett
^
Patricia S. Drawe
James A. Holtkamp
Mountain Fuel Supply Company

Q/'onhuj of. Yhd&—
Laurie L. Noda
Division of Public Utilities

Kent L. Walgr,en
Committee of 'Consumer Services

CfotUtO VD, f)Q
C h a r l e s M. D
Magnesium

k/ fanon of America

Robertv' i\ Reeder
KennecottCorporation and Hercules,
Inc. j&£-*4.

Kenneth 'G. Hurwftz
Nucor Steel
gs/g-u2dp.gad
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James A. Simpson
Phillips Petroleum

Bruce J, Barnard
Hill Air Force Base

David S. Christensen
Utah Energy Office

Brian W. Burnett
Central Valley Water Reclamation
Facility

Scott Gutting
ESI Group

Olof Zundel
Utility Shareholders Association of
Utah
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Investigation
of the Reasonableness of the Rates
and Tariffs of MOUNTAIN FUEL
SUPPLY COMPANY.

)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 89-057-15
ORDER ON APPLICATION
FOR REHEARING

ISSUED:

January 10. 1991

BY THE COMMISSION:
Mountain Fuel Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel" or "Company")
filed

with

the

Commission

an

Application

for

Rehearing

("Application") of our Order of November 21, 1990 in the aboveentitled and numbered matter on December 21, 1990. The Committee of
Consumer Services and the Division of Public Utilities have filed
responsive memoranda.
The Company's Application raises numerous issues most of which
we are persuaded have been adequately dealt with in our Order of
November 21, 1990. However, with respect to three issues we feel
constrained to supplement our Order.
1*

Post-test year adjustments.

The Company argues that because the Commission allowed posttest year adjustments in U.S. West Docket No. 88-049-07, issued
October 18, 1989, it must find them appropriate in this Docket or
provide some rationale for a departure from its prior "practice".
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). At this point
historic

test year without post-test

in time we consider the
year adjustments

to be

DOCKET NO. 89-057-15
- 2 -

appropriate and reasonable and the allowance of post-test year
adjustments or future test years to be exceptional. The choice of
test years lies within the discretion of the Commission based upon
a clear showing by the utility that its case merits special treatment. If that were not so, the existence of Section 54-4-4 (3)
would be superfluous.
In retrospect, we allowed U.S. West to make post-test year
adjustments without having adequately justified them. If we were
making that decision today, there is little doubt that those
adjustments would not be granted in the absence of additional
factual justification from U.S. West. As was indicated by the
Supreme Court in Utah Department of Business Regulation v. the
Public Service Commission, 614 P2d 1242 (1980) at 1249,
"In evaluating an application, the fundamental
principle involved is that post-test year adjustments
to expenses must be matched with post-test-year revenue
increases which might offset additional expenditures..
..To be entitled to an adjustment for increased wage
and salary expense the applicant must sustain its evidentiary burden to establish these payroll increases will
not be offset by productivity and increased sales."
In our judgment, Mountain

Fuel has not

on this record

justified the employment of post-test year adjustments.
Furthermore, we do not agree with the argument that our
granting of the post-test year adjustments in the U.S. West case
constitutes a Commission "practice" that now needs to be explained
and justified in this case.

00218
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Having so stated our current preference on test year, we will
also reiterate our statement on page 7 of our November 21, 1990
Order.
"In future proceedings, the Commission will decide
issues concerning test year, rate base, out-of-period
adjustments, and related matters prior to the onset of
hearings and based on the then existing conditions of the
utility and the economy in which it is operating."
The historic test year, which is our current preference, is no
more "set in concrete" than was our previous use of future test
years when the conditions required it.
2.

The reduction of the rate of return on equity from 12.2%
to 12.1%.

The Company complains that our reduction of return on equity
from 12.2% to 12.1% is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record, that it is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of Commission
discretion,

that

it

circumvents

federal

preemption

of

rate

regulation and that it constitutes a penalty or reparation outside
our statutory authority.
It is safe to say that setting rates, a part of which is the
establishment of the return on equity, is not a precise science.
The statute allows us to consider a number of factors in reaching
rate determinations considered "just and reasonable".

Preeminent

among these factors is the judgment of expert witnesses subjected
to cross-examination on the record. However, the importance of that
one factor does not preclude the Commission's taking other factors

/.ma*
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into

consideration,

including

such

things

as

the

utility's

affiliate relationships, once we have established a zone or range
of reasonable rates of return on equity. In this Docket, we infer
from the expert testimony a range from around 11.6% to something
less than 13%. While the extremes of this range are subject to
debate and judgment, the rate we have allowed the Company, 12.1%,
is squarely within the range, even though it is based at least in
part

on

our

perception

of the

Companyfs behavior

with

its

affiliates.
3.

Inconsistent treatment of certain other test year
adjustments.

Among other adjustments argued to have been given inconsistent
is

one

involving

five

industrial

customers

with

increased

purchases. The claim is that among these five industrial customers
is one who made a deferred main extension payment excluded by the
Commission. The net effect the Company asserts would be $266,000 in
additional revenues. We have examined the Company's exhibits on
which this claimed discrepancy is based and find them inconclusive,
which is another way of saying that the information is not there.
Nevertheless, we will allow the Company to clarify the exhibits and
anticipate that the Company will approach the other parties with a
view to having this adjustment stipulated and included in the Order
by way of an addendum.

JCC164
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ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mountain Fuel's
Application for Rehearing be and is hereby denied save for the
matter set forth in Section 3 hereof•
Notice is hereby given that a petition seeking judicial review
of the Commission's Order must be filed within 30 days of the date
of the denial of the application for rehearing.
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 10th day of January, 1991.

^21
BrianfT. Stewart. Chairman

Jam#s M. Byrne, Commissioner

<3U.£
Stephen/T. Mecham', Commissioner
/

7/

/

Attest:

tfepnen C. Hewlett, Commission
Comm:
Secretary

—t

/ //

y

ADDENDUM 2

ADDENDUM 2

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(4) (1990) (in relevant part):
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; . . .
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedures; . . .
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute; (ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; (iii)
contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or (iv)
otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (1990).
All charges made, demanded or received by any public utility
. . . for any product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, or
for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and reasonable. Every unjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or
received for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service, instrumentalities, equipment and
facilities as will promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience
of its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all respect
adequate, efficient, just and reasonable.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(2)(b) (1990):
The commission shall, after reasonable notice, hold a hearing
to determine whether the proposed rate increase or decrease, or some
other rate increase or decrease, is just and reasonable.
Utah Constitution, art 1, § 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, § 1.
. . . [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

D89-011A\ADD1.BFI

ADDENDUM 3

UTAH PSC PROCEEDINGS IN DOCKET NO. 89-057-15

1991

1990

First rate-effective 12 months
12-1-90 New rates become effective
11-21-90 PSC issues final order
9-5-90 Hearings commence (end 9-28-90)
3-31 90 MFS files rate request
11-7-89 PSC sets historic test year (reconfirmed 11-21-89)
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ADDENDUM 4

ADDENDUM 4
PREVIOUS MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
RATE PROCEEDINGS

Docket No.

Case Filed

Final Order

Future Test Year Approved

7113-11

Mar. 27, 1975 Dec. 1, 1975

Report and Order at 5, f 9

77-057-03

Apr. 4, 1977

Report and Order at 5, If 5

79-057-03

Mar. 30, 1979 Aug. 17, 1979

Report and Order, Stipulation, Ex. 1.

80-057-01

Oct. 16, 1979

Motion to Adopt Stipulation, Joint Ex. 1.

82-057-15

Sept. 3, 1982

May 2, 1983

Preliminary Order at 2,
1(a)

83-057-12

July 1, 1983

Sept. 2, 1983

Stipluation at 2, H 1

84-057-07

Aug. 8, 1984

Apr. 30, 1985

Final Report and Order at
5, H 3; at 8, H 6-7; at 13,
H12.

89-057-15

Mar. 30, 1990 Nov. 21, 1990

D89-0UA\ADD4.BFI

Dec. 29, 1985

Aug. 10, 1981

Order at 7

ADDENDUM 5

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
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In the Matter of the
Investigation of the
Reasonableness of the Rates
and Tariffs of Mountain
Fuel Supply Company.

Case No. 89-057-15
REPORTER 1 S TRANSCRIPT
OF PROCEEDINGS

Salt Lake City, Utah
Tuesday, November 7, 1989
10:00 a.m.

BEFORE:

BRIAN T. (TED) STEWART, Chairman, Public
Service Commission of Utah;
JAMES M. BYRNE, Commissioner, Public
Service Commission of Utah;
STEPHEN MECHAM, Commissioner, Public
Service Commission of Utah.

--0O0--

€©PY
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
160 E. 300 S. 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 530-6693

A P P E A R A N C E S
FOR MOUNTAIN FUEL
SUPPLY:

PATRICIA S. DRAWE, ESQ.
GARY G. SACKETT, ESQ.
180 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84139

FOR THE DIVISION OF MICHAEL GINSBERG, ESQ.
PUBLIC UTILITIES:
LAURIE NODA, ESQ.
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
FOR THE COMMITTEE
OF CONSUMER
SERVICES:

KENT WALGREN, ESQ.
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

FOR CENTRAL VALLEY
WATER RECLAMATION
FACILITY:

BRIAN W. BURNETT, ESQ.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
Kennecott Building, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah
84133

FOR BASIC MANUFACTURING AND TECHNOLOGIES:

GARY A. DODGE, ESQ.
Kimball, Parr, Crockett &
Waddoups
185 S. State Street, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

84144

FOR KENNECOTT,
F. ROBERT REEDER, ESQ.
AMOCO OIL COMPANY,
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
HERCULES, AND WEST- 185 S. State
ERN ZIRCONIUM A
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
DIVISION OF WESTINGHOUSE:

1

Date: November 7, 1989
Time: 10:00 a.m.
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the order dated

ask that

October

itself

into

the Wexpro
the ratepayers

1st, 1984 in docket

listed

of

order,
number

of the Company

its current

tlrat o r d ^ s , the Commission

WENDY

Division

note that the Questar

84-057-10 which was the request
reorganize

the

to

structure, in
a number

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
(801) 530-6693

of

6

1

conditions

2

restructur ing.

3

for approval

In item number

of that

corporate

3, in particular, addresses

4

questions

of affiliates

5

services provided

6

holding

7

either

8

'arm's length' basis and shall not exceed

9

rate

company

Questar

on a preferential

for comparable
governed

11

agreement

or approved

14

whether

15

also, if I may, point

16

Commission

17

took great exception

18

making

19

Committee

or not that condition

hope

21

of our order and

22

reoccur

in this

item

25

think

and

including

to respond

to

has been met.

completed

for the Division

I would

that

US West
in that
and

the affiliated

that you would

this
case

case

the
relations.

review

that we will not have

that

that

part

problem

case.

On the question

24

as

Commission,"

to the Company

to investigate

on an

the market

stipulation

out to the Company

in its recently

We would

23

by the

Supply be prepared

it difficult

shall be

services except

ask that all of the parties

Mountain

by the

basis or at a minimum

by the Wexpro

13

20

Fuel

and

or its subsidiaries

goods and

otherwise

We would

it says "Goods

to the utility corporation

10

12

and

the

of cost of capital, another

that was mentioned
the question

WENDY

in our prehearing

that we would

order, I

like to have

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
(801) 530-6693

addressed
affect

is, does the current

the business

increasing
Mountain

risk

corporate

of Questar,

the cost of capital

Fuel

Again,

structure

therefore,

to the ratepayers

of

Supply.

I would

note that

this is the first

case since the corporate

restructuring.

be the first

for that

opportunity

This

rate

will

issue to be

addressed.
Finally,

in the area

of cost of service,

the intention

of the Commission

hoc decisions

that we have made over

years; for example,
transportation
environmental
this

that all of the ad

the approval

rate case under

that everything

the last

few

of the

rate, the approval
rate and

it is

of an

so on, will be examined

the cost of service

is open; everything

in

category,

shall

should

be

addressed.
If a party wishes
surcharge

to argue that

on transportation

have the right

the five

cent

is inappropriate,

they

to do so though

they will be met

others who will disagree, we are assuming, but
any event, we would
that all cost

hope that you would

of service

with
in

understand

issues are wide open

in

this case*
I believe either Commissioner

WENDY

K. RANDALL, CSR,
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Byrne or

RPR

8

1

Commissioner

2

add

to what

3

Mecham may have something
I just went

was told by Doug

5

point

6

a gas optimization

7

or ought

8

affiliate

from

I f m wondering

12

MR. GINSBERG:

review

Yes, please.
There

is a gas

optimization

model

14

and was used

in the transportation

that was developed

J believe other cases.
the question
This

really

by Dr. Compton

case and I

If I could, maybe
throwing

is a non-gas cost

it back

I can

answer

to you.

rate case and

mix or the optimization

19

gas versus Questar

20

pass- through

21

number

22

the use of D24 gas or Mountain Fuel Supply's

own

23

gas

they

24

take under

gas

of the Mountain

the gas

18

25

can

Do you want me to answer

13

17

if that

on

respond?
COM. MECHAM:

16

had worked

relationships.

11

15

that at some

the Division

model.

MR. GINSBERG:
or

or Ms. Noda, I

to be part of this rate case as we

9
10

Mr. Ginsberg

Kirk of our staff

George Compton

to

through.

COM. MECHAM:

4

they want

Fuel

Supply

is and has been an issue in

cases where we have addressed a

of pass-through

in relationship

to the pipeline gas that

their FERC

The question

WENDY

cases, the optimization

of

tariffs.

I juess

is, does the

K. RANDALL, CSR,
(801) 530-6693

RPR

Commission

desire

that we would

address that

case or in a pass-through
of Mountain

Fuel

Supply

case where

are at

transactions

Commission,
Commission

but would

be directly

indirect

it would

in a

between

and among

application, even

In a pass-through
the pass-through

that

there's not enough
it seems

the
the

case

that

would
in this

various
affiliate

it would

have at

in a non-gas

case, grant

with

to that

be more appropriate

of this company,

issue and

the

rates

My response

case because as we are reviewing

interests

the

case.

I think

relationships

or the

before

before

of setting

COM. MECHAM:
be that

costs

relationship

are not directly

for purposes

pass-through

the gas

cost

issue?

In this case the affiliated
gas cost

in a non-gas

cost

it, my

there's more

case.

experience

is minimal, but

time to really

least

it seems

address

the

time to do it

here .
MR. GINSBERG:
would

take to do that kind of study, but

certainly

could

it

it

be done.

COM. STEWART:
done

I don't know how long

Let's presume

it will be

then.
COM. BYRNE:

WENDY

I think probably

K. RANDALL, CSR,
(801) 530-6693
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the

10

emphasis, Mr, Ginsberg, ought

to be on the

of how gas

than the

is acquired

that we would
I also
regulating
issues

rather

see in a pass-through

think

in a piece meal

Stewart

case.
in

is that we deal with
fashion.

As

the

Commissioner

indicated, we haven't had a rate case

five years and we have had
cases dealing
that

specifics

that one of the problems

this company

structure

with

numerous

specifically

for

pass-through

the issues of gas at

time.
We also attempt

FERC with Questar
comprehensive
system

pipeline, but

analysis

is working

had a chance

to follow

the proceedings
in terms of a

of how this gas

delivery

for the ratepayer, we just

to really do

haven't

that.

So it may be that the Division will have
back

and

think about

then come back

approached.

to us how you think

I think

the gas acquisition
to utilize

this for a little while

to us if you really

perhaps explain

that

the reference

think

to sit
and

it's -- and

this ought

to be

specifically

model, I'm not sure myself

in this

were

to
how

case.

MR. GINSBERG:
we used

thai ior

whether

or not the amount

WENDY

at

The kind of studies

I believe with respect
of D24 gas was

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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that
to

like

being

11

taken f
mix

should

be increased

between Mountain

amount
under

that

they

Fuel

and whether

or not

Supply's own gas, the

take and

the amount

that

their FERC contract

as through

Questar

pipeline, what

is the best mix

the kinds of studies

the

they

for that.

take

Those

I think we have done

are

in the

pas t.
COM. BYRNE:
for here

in terms of the affiliate

to step back

from

entire picture
ratepayer
interest

I think what we are

and

relationships

that a bit and take a look

of how gas

is acquired

if it's being

of the ratepayer.

specifically

asking

address

acquired
Whether

for

the

the

in the

best

we need

that model or not,

at

is

to

I'm

not

sure .
MR. BURNETT:

The model was utilized

analyze whether

or not gas

appropriate

to the degree

and

is a five percent
model would

that

addressed

the gas

per decatherm

be of some
COM. BYRNE:

things

transportation

I recall

was

transportation

charge, perhaps

the

assistance.
I guess the only

from previous cases

that we haven't mentioned

terms of the services provided

other
that

to Mountain

K. RANDALL, CSR,
(801) 530-6693

were

so far were

RPR

in

Fuel

Supply by its subsidiaries, by its corporate

WENDY

to

family

12

1

m e m b e r s , real estate services, computer

2

the various

3

services

4

other

5

the Division has reviewed

6

are

legal services, I believe

that are provided

affiliates

within

affiliate

9

were

relationships

arm by

family

and

those and whether

how

those

All of those type of
that you have talked

the type that we would

10

case with

respect

11

and

services

12

company.

other

13

any questions

15

Walgren?

16

that are provided

17

One

issue that's

18

had

a chance

19

does

20

the Commission's

21

date

22

Fuel?

in this

by the

at this

raised

to look carefully

is and

Mr.

at the statute, but

issued

Does anyone know that
COM. STEWART:

in this or

that
the

Mountain

offhand?

I believe

by Mountain

WENDY

have

I haven't

to run from the date

order was

MR. GINSBERG:

parent

time?

the filing was actually made by

date of filing

computers

Yes, a couple of questions.

just been

the 240 days start

about

Do any of the parties

of the Commission

MR. WALGREN:

that

be reviewing

to corporate overheads,

COM. STEWART:

14

25

various

to the utility

the Questar

MR. GINSBERG:

8

24

the

appropriate.

7

23

services,

it's from

the

Fuel.
I

A

ink it depends

K. RANDALL, CSR,
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what

the filing

only

applies

to rate

rate decreases
on

that

requests

or status quo, so it really

if there's a statutory

Committee
that's set

based
like
those

would

is in the UP&L

filing

requirements

on Carl Mowers
the filing

of Mountain

applied.
the

case

filing,

that are being

study.

to

depends

issue that

for next year, there are some

The Committee

proposed
would

Fuel to also comply

with

requirements.

requirements

STEWART:

this matter.
Company

and

I don't

filing

I think we have just got

to justify

for

its rates for

to delay

to have
at

the

the

1990 and we will

there.

Hopefully,

as I indicated

those uniform

utilities

filing

today also, we will

requirements

in the state some day, but

some distance

away

for

they are

If not

Ms. Drawe, can you give us an idea of when
can make

its

WENDY

all
still

from us.

Are there any other questions?

Company

months

think we want

make a filing, as I indicated

beginning,
from

Those uniform

probably will not be known

by the Commission

have

time period

The other

like raised

COM.

go

The 240 days

increases and does not apply

MR. WALGREN:

uniform

if anything.

then,
the

filing?

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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MS, DRAWE:
term commitment

Based

to a future

cases, we had discussed
on or before March

are

the filing

to explore

and maybe we would

ultimately

year

before March

understanding

that meets

is the filing

We could.

time if
that we

It's our
investigation

issues and we feel in

job and to put together
the requirements

that's a reasonable

an

that you

time

for us to

into a holiday period.

We could

i t.
We are coming

do

test

But you cannot make a

rate case

to do a thorough

have set up that
do

the correct

that you do want a full

of all of the normal

application

application

1st?

MS. DRAWEe:

order

of an

rate

to make.

COM. STEWART:
filing

for

need some additional

the historical

required

test year

long

1st.

I think we need
year

on the Company's

it sooner

speeding

if you

felt

there was some benefit

up the process.
COM. BYRNE:

problems with

that

M s . Drawe, one of the

is that we have scheduled

a rate case for PacifiCorp
getting

to

a filing

next year which will be

in the March

timeframe.

had hoped we could move at a much more

WENDY

already

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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I at

least

rapid

15

schedule

than

that.

It may be that
been said
approach

here today affect
this case and

have a technical
parties about
setting

any more

or discussion

I'm

STEWART:

not

& Light

in any

15th

it up

going

track

with

likely.

For the Committee

and

I'm

let a contract

to do that, so we are also
in this at about
COM.

STEWART:

also, to

to have to get
told

would

looking

the same

that

the

be March
if we

schedule.

Let's go off

the

record

just a mi nute.
(Discussion

off

COM. STEWART:
record.
that

that

event.

appropriation

that we can

participate

for

an identical

in this case we are going

a supplemental
soonest

anticipate

or so, so we are

That's

MR. WALGREN:

the

look at

to push you, you couldn't move

MS. DRAWE:

participate

to

sure.

I would

than what, a month

Power

would

among

issues before we can

to be, regardless, on almost
Utah

have

it may be that we need

the schedule.

if we were

that

how the parties

conference

various

COM.
even

some of the things

First

the

record)

Let's go back

on the

of all, M s . Drawe, are you

the Company

is going

WENDY

confident

to be arguing

for a future

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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test

year?
MS. DRAWE:

Ninety nine

percent

conf ident, yes.
COM. STEWART:
set a hearing

date

Then

that on the

for

Will you be prepared

Okay.

Let's set

law and motion

on the

21st.

MR. GINSBERG:

Isn't

them

or not

in the

ligh

issue?

Not really.

the Commission

that

The

is going

question
to order

to file a historical .test year or a future

year.

That

to me is a legal
COM. BYRNE:

legal

it more

issue than a legal

COM. STEWART:
is whether

to

Yes.

COM. STEWART:

of an evidentiary

tha

21st?

MS. DRAWE:

matter

and

for that so that we can hear

issue as soon as we can.
argue

let's go ahead

issue.

I don't

interpret

issue. I mean, clearly within

can have historical
I think

in a practical

COM. STEWART:
COM. BYRNE:
makes more sense.

Policy
Policy

future

WENDY

years

sense what

issue.

Which

The Chairman has just

test year.

test

--

issue.

that had we had -- well, in the past
has been

it as a

the statute we

test years or future

the argument

tes

the

We have with

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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one

indicated
precedent
the

other

fixed

utilities

right now historic

and.we have a period
inflation,

where we are seeing

less pressure

things

that were

in the

past.

So I don't

test year

on rates and

the argument

can convince

the way

to go as a practical matter,

us that the future

test

years

if the
test year

that's

is

what

to do.
MS. DRAWE: Could

basically
historic

those kinds of

issue

Company

they need

lesser

for future

see it as a legal

cases

I ask

if you

putting

forth a new policy

test year

is what you want

are you basing
You mentioned

are

that

the

in any case or

it on the facts at the present
that

inflation

is not

rampant

time?

at

this

time .
COM. BYRNE:
tied

I would

up in the rulemaking

whether

we are making

I think

that

with a historic

here

If Mountain
test j e a r

it was appropriate
The companies

Supply

year.

fixed
to deal
agreed

feels strongly

is the way we ought

WENDY

two

test

and

it.

Fuel

that.

about

a rule for historic

test year.

we went ahead with

reevaluate

argument

in the case of the other

utilities, we decided

future

hate to think we got

We haven't done

to go,

that a
let's

it for five

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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or more and obviously
quite different

the conditions

than they are

COM. MECHAM:
an exercise

discretionary

were

now.

I would

of Commission

in 1984

characterize

discretion.

it as

I mean

it's

whether we go with a future year

or

not.
MS. DRAWE:
in future

Would

it be subject

MR. REEDER:
anticipate making

Yes.
Does

a record

the

or does

it prefer

rulemaking

process

to exercise

COM. MECHAM:
to do that

upon which

judiciary

to do

of

it in the

its

its

comment

discretion?

I believe we are setting a

for the

MR. REEDER:

Commission

for the exercise

discretion

a record

review

cases?
COM. STEWART:

hearing

to

21st.

Evidentiary

hearing

to make a decision

to make

and a

process?
COM. MECHAM:

That appears

to me to be

exactly what we are doing, Mr. Reeder.
COM. BYRNE:

We have made a decision, Mr.

Reeder, and we are giving

the parties an

to tell us why we are mistaken
believe

this

is a discretionary

MR. WALGREN:

WENDY

in doing

opportunity
that.

We do

matter.

Wouldn't

that

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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presentation
likely

to be the most

rates and

in setting

evidentiary
not

of some evidence, though f

rates?

issue there?

the Commission

in basing

useful way

with

have decided

we want

We w i l l f
and

test year

appropriate.
21st

to hear

We will

I think

set

the

not

statute

as to whether

or historical

however, allow

We will

or

or

on --

a historical

argue that a future

of whether

its discretion

gives us the discretion

a future

in determining

The question

COM. STEWART:
clearly

what's

Isn't there an

is abusing

the test year

on

test year.

test

to come

in

is more

set a hearing

for

that on the law and motion
it at 10:00 on October

We

year.

any party

test year

we go

November
calendar.

21st --

November

21st.
Ms. Drawe, if the Commission
we were going
can

to stick with a historical

the Company

still make

MS. DRAWE:
no, we could
month
and

February
more

and

its filing

end

need an

1st?

that

additional

figures that were

then an April

year,

by March

and made available which would
that

that

test

It's my understanding

not, that we would

to take the year

audited

was to hold

be

final
early

1st filing would

be

reasonable.

WENDY

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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COM.
getting

off

direction

opposite

probably
that

versus

discuss

& Liiht

future

file

by the Commission

test year.

that matter

in the

possible,

of when you should

a decision

those of you who are

should

up

from what we considered

the question

have to await

historical

Well, we may end

the track with Utah Power

I think
will

STEWART:

So we will

again on the 21st

interested

on a

in that

so

issue

be here.

I'm
whether

talking
you

historical

about

intend

the schedule, regardless

to argue

test year.

With

there any other questions

for or against
that

at this

MR. GINSBERG:

in mind

of

the

then, are

time?

Would we use the 21st as

a time where we can more define the type of -- come
back

to you with what you have given us today with a

more

specific

we would

approach

on the type of studies

that

be doing?
COM. STEWART:

That would

be h e l p f u l .

MR. GINSBERG:

With a more

COM. STEWART:

Yes and again,

detailed

schedule?

are any other questions
of what

the Commission

you could

raise

that you may have
intends

them on the

WENDY

if
in

this case to

there
terms
include,

21st.

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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COM. BYRNE:
burden

I think

determination
Company

in this case

on which

The Division's
of the other
that's
kinds

things

the analysis
of issues.

very helpful

to come forward

filing

burden

if the Division

on their

affiliate
that

and

has made

company

organized

it seems

and

could

it would

come

those
be

back.
to

affirmative

relations?

be.

the Company

on

those

My personal

that's going

view

will provide

its affirmative
the way

case.

it deems

is

to do an
the

by the Division, but

is

It has

the
its

appropriate

to me that's a given.

COM. STEWART:

Mr. Ginsberg,

however, take the view that
paragraph

relations

the Company

as requested

Company

and

from

it's the Division

information

and

area

Well, I'm not sure what an

relations would

investigation

for

forth any

affiliated

filing

forward.

You are not going

to put

COM. BYRNE:

the

in the

that we have asked
of affiliate

the

with

is probably

So I think perhaps

the Company

affirmative

the

to base rates going

MR. GINSBERG:
require

in terms of

of rates, we have indicated

has the burden

information

We have got sort of a split

3 from the order

WENDY

in light of

I would,
the

in the paragraph

K. RANDALL, CSR,
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1984 case that
Company

I read

to you earlier

has the affirmative

establish

that

tne utility
subsidiaries

are either

of justifying

company

or

to

its

on a preferential

those

to

services provided

on an arm's length basis, so I think
burden

the

responsibility

the goods and

by the holding

that

basis or

they have

relationships

the

pursuant

to

that order .
MR. GINSBERG:
First, maybe
historical

the Company

information

I have two other

comments.

could provide use of

with certain

forecasts

for

the rest of 1989 and then provide actual data as it
becomes available.
hinder

the process

certainly

I don't
or speed

is I think

know

if that

would

up the process, but it

something

that should

be

considered .
We do have certain
available
forecast
could

and we don't

amounts of actual

-- we have obviously a

for the rest of 1989.

provide

data

Whether

or not you

actuals with

forecasts

for

this year and update those

to actual

results

they are

the rest of
when

available.
COM. STEWART:

tnat's going

Again, Mr. Ginsberg,

to await our decision on the test

MR. GINSBERG:

WENDY

I guess my question

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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Mountain

Fuel whether

in that format

rather

are closed

1989

for

they could provide

that

than waiting

their

them

to go with

to file

certain
number

of months

of months

of

speed

converted

up the —

COM.

Ginsberg, and

STEWART:

that

or not the Wexpro
the ratepayer
ended,

been

Second,

provide any

I was

by me when

wondering

that you wanted
agreement?

I read

I think

the

it to you, Mr.

agreement

is helping

or

That's pretty

I can't be any more

hurting
open
specific.

MR. GINSBERG:

Okay.

COM. STEWART:

The Wexpro agreement

eight years.

on the ratepayers

WENDY

us

is we want you to tell us whether

I realize, but

the other; perhaps

that

additional

Well, again,

of the state.

in effect

impact

with

I don't know whether

to the Wexpro

was stated

tell

the actuals have to be

could

respect

and

for example,

of the type of analysis

to do with

standard

test year

to

of acutals and a certain

into a test year.

if the Commission
comments

lst f

if we were

forecasting?

MR, GINSBERG:
would

You mean

a historical

it February

number

books

--

COM. STEWART:
decide

until

sooner

It has had

has

substantial

of this state one way or

it's neutral.

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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The only people who can tell us that would
the Division

and

it will come under

by the other parties
end

in this proceeding

scrutiny

and at

the

of the case, we hopefully will be able to say,

"Yes, the Wexpro
indifferent."
Are

close

be

agreement

I'm

sorry

I can't be more

there any additional
MR. DODGE:

we request

that

intervenors

Commissioner

those appearing

without

filing

MR. DODGE:

Thank

affect

schedule.

on November

longer

asked

be able

the Company's

prior

be working
timeframe

about whether

if we
Company

of actuals

because

to move

filing

to

that

as

will

forward

more

if they had
filing

that

they

Otherwise, we will see a

requested

WENDY

Company

21st relative

to the Company's
with.

the

test year, the

so many projected

The Division would
after

you.

of so many months

and

could

you.

with a historic

normalized

information

Yes.

Mr. Ginsberg

make a filing

rapidly

pleadings?

Could we ask

do go forward

the

formal

COM. BYRNE:
respond

could

today be deemed

Thank

the question

could

Stewart,

MR. REEDER:

to also

specific.

questions?

COM. STEWART:

then

is good, bad or

by the Division

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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the Company's

filing

and when we can actually

have a

case •
MR. GINSBERG:
begin

requesting

would

provide

information

Many

normalizing

that as a test
COM.

of them will

STEWART:

at this

some mechanism

provide

filing

the actual

other

I had one other

or should

comment.

in order

by the

that wait until

to

I think

filing, Mr. Ginsberg.

and we are not going

until March

be plenty

interested
determine

it can wait

is going

to do

to see an

I mean, again, we are here

until

there's an

anybody

actual

today, but

the

does

by the Company,

not

so

of time for any party who may

in this case to examine
whether

WENDY

or not their

that

later.

of this proceeding

the filing

until

I don't know

1st, maybe even

commencement

Should

Company?

any good

will

to 1989,

Are there any

notice at this time

commence

those

year.

a public

actual

as we have

relate

be provided

COM. STEWART:

filing

we

a public notice of this proceeding?

it be published
actual

and

to

time?

MR. GINSBERG:
Should

intention

immediately

those to the Company

requested.

questions

It was our

the filing

interests

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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affected .
COM. BYRNE:
gone out

I think notice has

to all of the parties

have an interest

in this

MS. DRAWE:
Ginsberg?
data
think

if there's

filing,

interest

of that

more difficult

Fuel right

in our having

and

away.

a timely
into

to be having

in, so I would
although

there may be some

I

the

numerous

will make

suggest

it

of
that

those

for

their

certainly

information

that

need.

of benefits

incorporate

I think

of us providing

soon as possible.
that

Some

them data

requests

they

could

in receiving

think we are suggesting

they felt

that

in them making

it was required

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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that

or if
we

the

to be made

I think we are just say* ,g if we started

WENDY

as

filing, information

interested

cause any delay at all

filing whenever

there's a number

information

into their

that we are

it's -- I don't

and

to Mr.

to the task at hand

MR. GINSBERG:

they know

that

like to start

the same period

somewhat

reports

they would

would

that he'd

filing

to tend

the filing

may be delayed
initial

I respond

to Mountain

requests during

getting

Could

there will be a lot of work going

preparation
data

that we know of

proceeding,

He's suggested

requests coming

already

our
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process
rather

now, it would

speed

than us waiting

until April

COM. STEWART:
request

that

informally

now and

or even

forecasted

completely

and discuss
the

but on the other

and

to have a

test year, for

example,
are

I think you ought

try to discuss

have any problems, bring

types

speculative

I think your points

legitimate, Mr. Ginsberg.
together

those

that's

if we are going

hand,

set a date

to be on a fishing

information

actual historical

Let me

21st.

the Division

requesting

begin.

to do so meet

after we are through here and

I don't want
expedition

to even

the parties who desire

issues between

proceeding

Let me ask this.

where you can get together
of

up the entire

that and

then

them up again

to meet

if you

on the

21st,

if you would, Ms. Drawe.
MR. GINSBERG:
a historical
measurable
of

the test

test year, were you

changes

that would

STEWART:

including

have occurred

known

to
and

outside

Mr. Ginsberg, we have a

on known and measurable

to quite consistently
will

referring

year?
COM.

policy

When you were

abide by that.

that we

in the US West order and
Does

MR. GINSBERG:

WENDY

changes

that answer your
That's

refer
we

question?

fine.

K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR
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COM. STEWART:

Are there any other

questions at this time?

If not, we will be in

recess until November 21st at 10:00 a.m.
(Whereupon the preceedings were
concluded)
*

*

*

*
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